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POLITICAL EXTERNALITIES, FEDERALISM, AND A




Interstate environmental harms, which occur when decisions or actions in one
state produce negative environmental impacts in another state, have challenged en-
vironmental law and American federalism for over a century. While even the strong-
est advocates of state primacy in environmental policy concede that interstate
environmental harms necessitate federal governance, federal adjudication and regu-
lation have had only modest success in addressing the problem. This is due, in part,
to a failure to fully understand the causes of interstate environmental harms. This
article provides a newframeworkfor understanding interstate environmental harms
as political externalities caused by a combination of inadequate information, public
process bias, and traditional economic externalities. To address these causes, this
article proposes a new state-based approach termed interstate environmental impact
assessment. Interstate environmental impact assessment would provide a procedu-
ral mechanism for an affected state and its citizens to influence the source state and
minimize or prevent interstate environmental harms. The process itself would ad-
dress the causes of political externalities, and also produce information to improve
federal adjudication and regulation when disputes arise over continuing harms.
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INTRODUCTION
One of the foundational justifications for the federalization of environ-
mental law is the problem of interstate environmental harms.' Interstate en-
vironmental harms occur when decisions and activities in one state cause
pollution or other negative environmental impacts in another state. The na-
ture of these harms suggests that they not be left to the individual states to
address, but instead warrant a strong role for the federal government and
regional governance institutions. 2 However, federal and regional responses
to interstate environmental harms have had only limited success.3 Other
scholars have provided persuasive recommendations for improving federal
regulation 4 and federal adjudication5 of interstate harms, and in a previous
article I advanced a cooperative horizontal federalism model for improving
interstate regional environmental management.6 While improved federal and
regional governance are important, some interstate environmental harms do
not justify the political costs of these more complex collective action
solutions. 7
This article proposes another potential solution that respects state sover-
eignty while directly addressing the informational and political process bi-
'Richard L. Revesz, Federalism and Interstate Environmental Externalities, 144 U. PA.
L. Rav. 2341, 2346 (1996) ("[T]he rationale for federal regulation premised on the problem
of interstate externalities is analytically unimpeachable."). See also Jonathan H. Adler, Juris-
dictional Mismatch in Environmental Federalism, 14 N.Y.U. ENVTh. L.J. 130, 140 (2005)
("The strongest case for federal involvement comes in the context of interstate spillovers, such
as when pollution crosses state lines and the affected states are unable to resolve the conflict
on their own.").
2 See Thomas W. Merrill, Golden Rules for Transboundary Pollution, 46 DuKE L.J. 931,
932 (1997) ("Given the inherent difficulties in regulation by any single state, transboundary
pollution would seem to present a clear case for shifting regulatory authority from local to
more centralized levels of governance.").
3 See generally id. at 947 (the federal adjudicative system has not given "the kind of
sustained attention to the problem [of transboundary pollution] that is probably necessary if a
coherent body of decisional law is to emerge"); 959-61 (describing the shortcomings of fed-
eral statutory law): 965-67 (describing the shortcomings of regional compacts and
agreements).
' See generally Revesz, supra note 1 (providing a new approach to interstate air pollution
as a model for federal policy on interstate environmental harms).
5 See Merrill, supra note 2. Merrill provides a new liability scheme for transboundary
pollution based on the "golden rule" that an "affected state is entitled to be treated by the
source state in the same way as the affected state treats its own citizens." Id. at 936.
6 See generally Noah D. Hall, Toward A New Horizontal Federalism: Interstate Water
Management in the Great Lakes Region, 77 U. CoLo. L. REV. 405 (2006) (advancing coopera-
tive horizontal federalism as an approach for states to bind themselves to common substantive
and procedural environmental protection standards, implemented individually with regional
resources and enforcement).
7 See Merrill, supra note 2, at 976-79.
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ases that often lead to inefficient interstate environmental harms.' Interstate
environmental harms are often inefficient because they result from source
state decisions that fail to account for both technical information and public
opposition regarding the impacts in the affected state.9 As almost all inter-
state environmental harms also produce negative impacts in the source state,
more complete accounting for impacts in the affected state may bolster
source state considerations that weigh against a source of harm.'0
Building on this conceptual approach, this article provides a framework
for an interstate environmental impact assessment policy. Such a policy
would draw on existing models including the National Environmental Policy
Act ("NEPA")," state environmental impact assessment laws, and interna-
tional transboundary environmental impact assessment law. Individual
states could effect an interstate environmental impact assessment either
through the adoption of a new uniform act or, where applicable, through
non-discriminatory application of existing state laws to citizens of other
states.
Most instances of pollution and other environmental harms can be
viewed as economic externalities, in which the benefits of the polluting ac-
tivity are realized by one actor, but the costs are externalized on other actors
or society as a whole.'2 Interstate pollution and environmental harms in-
volve a traditional economic externality compounded by public process and
lack of information biases resulting from the lack of accountability to, and
knowledge of, the affected state. The focus of both public and private envi-
ronmental law is to require internalization of externalized environmental
costs. 3 This challenge is complicated for interstate environmental externali-
ties by considerations of state sovereignty. While pollution and other envi-
ronmental harms do not recognize state boundaries, our legal and political
systems certainly do.
The interests of state sovereignty cut both ways in this context, as states
enjoy both the right to regulate (or to not regulate) most environmentally
harmful activities within their jurisdiction, and the right to be free of harm
emanating from other states. 14 The federal government has attempted to bal-
l Inefficient interstate environmental harms refer to those environmental harms that are
only allowed because the harm is not imposed on the source state.
'See William W. Buzbee, Recognizing the Regulatory Commons: A Theory of Regulatory
Gaps, 89 IOWA L. REV. 1, 27-28 (2003).
10 See Merrill, supra note 2, at 977-78.
" National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-190, 83 Stat. 852 (codified
as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4347 (2000)).
2 See Daniel C. Esty, Environmental Protection in the Information Age, 79 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 115, 154 (2004).
13 See Henry N. Butler & Jonathan R. Macey, Externalities and the Matching Principle:
The Case for Reallocating Environmental Regulatory Authority, 14 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 23,
29 (1996).
" Compare Georgia v. Tenn. Copper Co., 206 U.S. 230, 237 (1907) ("[the state] has the
last word as to whether its mountains shall be stripped of their forests and its inhabitants shall
breathe pure air") with Missouri v. Illinois, 200 U.S. 496, 525-26 (1906) (declining to impose
liability on the source state based on uncertain evidence of causation and harm).
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ance these competing principles, historically through adjudication of inter-
state nuisance liability, 5 and in more recent decades through statutes
addressing specific types of interstate pollution.' 6 Yet while all three
branches of the federal government 7 have grappled with the problem of in-
terstate environmental harms, results have been inconsistent at best. 8 Of
course, states can also negotiate with each other to address interstate envi-
ronmental harms and enter into compacts and other interstate agreements.1 9
But the transaction costs and political challenges of interstate compacts ex-
plain why this solution is rarely employed. 0
This article proposes a new approach - interstate environmental im-
pact assessment - that respects state sovereignty while directly addressing
the causes of inefficient interstate environmental harms. The centerpiece of
this approach is a process conducted by the source state to gather informa-
tion and public views from the affected state and its citizens. Interstate envi-
ronmental impact assessment would correct the lack of information and
public accountability biases at the state level that produce interstate environ-
mental harms. While only procedural, it would also produce detailed infor-
mation that could be used within the federal adjudicatory and regulatory
legal regime to resolve disputes that continued following the state process.
This approach builds on a foundation of environmental law, NEPA, and the
many state statutes modeled after NEPA.2' States would individually enact
an interstate environmental impact assessment policy, using a model uni-
'" See, e.g., 206 U.S. at 239; 200 U.S. 496.
16 Most notably, both the federal CAA and the federal CWA contain provisions intended
to address interstate air and water pollution, respectively. See CAA §§ 1 l0(a)(2)(D), 126(b),
42 U.S.C. §§ 7410(a)(2)(D), 7426(b) (2000); CWA § 402(b)(3)(5), 33 U.S.C. § 1342(b)(3)(5)
(2000).
" In addition to the adjudicative function of the federal courts and the legislative function
of Congress, the federal government has attempted to address interstate pollution through ex-
ecutive interpretation and enforcement by EPA. See 40 C.F.R. § 122.4(d) (2007) (interpreting
the CWA to prohibit issuance of a permit to a point source "[wihen the imposition of condi-
tions cannot ensure compliance with the applicable water quality requirements of all affected
States"); see also Arkansas v. Oklahoma, 503 U.S. 91 (1992) (upholding EPA's interpretation
of the CWA).
"8 See Adler, supra note 1, at 162-63 (criticizing the minimal attention paid to interstate
externalities under congressional environmental statutes, the limitations of the federal courts in
the application of interstate nuisance, and EPA's poor record in addressing interstate harms).
See also Revesz, supra note 1, at 2346 (noting that the problem of interstate externalities "has
not been effectively redressed in the current [federal] pollution-control scheme"); Merrill,
supra note 2, at 947, 959-61, 965-67; Rena I. Steinzor, EPA and Its Sisters at 30: Devolution,
Revolution, or Reform?, 31 ENVTL. L. REP. 11086, 11092 (2001) (noting that the "EPA has not
done a very good job of addressing transboundary pollution").
" See Hall, supra note 6, at 4 10-11.
20 See Revesz, supra note 1, at 2375. See also Hall, supra note 6, at 454 ("For a compact
to be enacted, it requires uniform ratification by each state's legislative body and approval by a
simple majority in both houses of Congress, which can modify the terms of the compact to
protect national interests. The process for enacting a compact is thus a political obstacle
course.").
2 A recent survey indicated that thirty-two states have some form of an environmental
impact assessment policy modeled after NEPA. See Richard L. Revesz, Federalism and Envi-
ronmental Regulation: A Public Choice Analysis, 115 HARV. L. REV. 553, 617-18 (2001).
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form act or amending existing state environmental impact assessment laws.
To create an incentive for individual states to enact such a policy, the inter-
state environmental impact assessment obligation would only apply to af-
fected states that have also enacted a similar policy.
This article is organized in three parts. Part I first provides a theoretical
explanation of the problem of interstate environmental harms as political
externalities. Viewing interstate environmental harms as simply an exten-
sion of economic externalities ignores the complexity of state regulatory and
political decisions, which are important to finding a state-based solution.
Part II examines the federal and regional responses to interstate environmen-
tal harms, focusing on the roles of both vertical and horizontal federalism.
While interstate environmental harms are a primary justification for federal
and regional regulation, in practice these efforts have had only limited suc-
cess. Further, the political investment needed to overcome the transaction
costs inherent in a federal or regional solution is only justified in limited
circumstances of interstate environmental harms. This leads to revisiting the
role that individual states can play in addressing interstate environmental
harms. Part III proposes adoption of interstate environmental impact assess-
ment policies at the state level as a mechanism to directly address the politi-
cal externalities that lead to interstate environmental harms. While officials
of the source state cannot be made electorally accountable to the citizens of
the affected state, information and public process are other valid forms of
political influence and accountability. From this perspective, the key ele-
ments of a pragmatic interstate environmental impact assessment policy are
outlined and discussed. Potential criticisms of the proposal, and responses to
those criticisms, are also considered in Part III.
I. INTERSTATE ENVIRONMENTAL HARMS AS POLITICAL EXTERNALITIES
The first step in developing and evaluating legal and policy solutions to
interstate environmental harms is to understand the problem these solutions
seek to address. This Part first explains the many forms that interstate envi-
ronmental harms can take, including but not limited to interstate pollution.
Several basic examples are provided to give a context for the problem. This
Part then examines the conceptual causes of these harms - notably eco-
nomic externalities, public process biases, and lack of information regarding
impacts in the affected state. Taken together, these conceptual causes of
interstate environmental harms can be described as political externalities.
A. The Problem of Interstate Environmental Harms
Almost by definition, environmental impacts cross boundaries and af-
fect locations other than their source. Most environmental laws address
harms that cross property boundaries and negatively impact the property of
another. An activity on B's property results in an environmental harm that
20081
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crosses the property boundary line and affects A's property. This basic sce-
nario is illustrated in the classic English case from the early seventeenth
century, Aldred's Case. 2  Thomas Benton (B) operated a pig sty that pol-
luted the air across the property boundary, affecting the home of William
Aldred (A). 23 In this setting, as in most conventional environmental dis-
putes, the environmental harm crosses a property boundary, which is an eco-
nomic demarcation.
Environmental harms that affect persons and property other than the
source of the harm are a basic example of an economic externality. Exter-
nalities are simply costs and benefits that are not directly priced by the mar-
ket system, and thus not necessarily considered by a market actor.24
Returning to the classic example from English law, Benton receives the eco-
nomic benefit of his pig farming operation (presumably through the use or
sale of pork), while Aldred bears at least some of the economic costs (depre-
ciation in his property value from odor and air pollution).2 1 While there is
considerable debate about how to best address environmental economic ex-
ternalities, 26 this article is not concerned with environmental externalities
that are generated and imposed within the same legal and political jurisdic-
tion. Rather, the focus here is on environmental externalities that are gener-
ated in one state but imposed on another state.
There are several types of interstate environmental externalities. This
article is concerned primarily with physical interstate environmental harms
generated in one state and affecting another state. The most obvious form of
this type of interstate environmental externality is transboundary air and
water pollution. Transboundary air and water pollution occur when a facility
or activity in state A creates pollution that moves through an air or water
medium and affects the environment of state B. While some amount of air
and water pollution will inevitably affect states beyond the source, 27 deci-
sions regarding both the design and the location of polluting facilities can
maximize or minimize the impact of the pollution on other states.2 8
The importance of design and location decisions for interstate pollution
is illustrated with a few basic examples. In the context of air pollution,
22 William Aldred's Case, 77 Eng. Rep. 816 (K.B. 1611).
23 1d. at 817.
24 See Butler & Macey, supra note 13, at 29.
25 Benton tried unsuccessfully to use a social utility defense, stating that "the building of
the house for hogs was necessary for the sustenance of man." William Aldred's Case, 77 Eng.
Rep. at 817, 821-22. Essentially this argument is based on the premise that Benton's activities
have positive externalities for society that outweigh the negative externalities to Aldred.
26 For the primary works on the efficiency and distributive justice of addressing externali-
ties, see Ronald H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J. L. & ECON. 1 (1960) and Guido
Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalienability: One
View of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1089 (1972). For a thorough (but still partial) list of
the subsequent academic discussion of pollution in the law and economics tradition, see Henry
E. Smith, Exclusion and Property Rules in the Law of Nuisance, 90 VA. L. REV. 965, 966 n.2
(2004).
27 See discussion of inevitable interstate environmental harms at Part I.B., infra.
28 See Revesz, supra note I, at 2351.
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higher smokestacks reduce the pollution impacts close to the source and in-
crease the pollution impacts farther from the source.2 9 States could require
higher smokestacks as a way to minimize the environmental harms of air
pollution within their state and shift the air pollution harms to neighboring
states.30 Similarly, the location of facilities directly impacts the proportion
of pollution harms felt in the source state versus a downwind or downstream
state. For example, if a river runs west to east through state A, water pollu-
tion discharged at a location in the western part of the state will primarily
harm state A, while water pollution discharged at a point in the eastern part
of the state Will cause more harm in state B. So, a state seeking to minimize
the environmental harms of water pollution on its portion of a river and shift
the water pollution harms to a neighboring state's portion of the river could
restrict pollution upstream while encouraging siting of facilities
downstream.3
While interstate air and water pollution are the most obvious forms of
physical interstate environmental harms, there are other significant environ-
mental problems analogous to interstate pollution. For example, states tend
to locate landfills and other waste disposal facilities near their borders, exter-
nalizing the environmental impacts of these facilities on neighboring states.3 2
This occurs so commonly that it has been termed "state line syndrome."33
Locating waste disposal facilities near a state line externalizes some of the
potential harms from leakage of waste and water contamination at the facil-
ity.34 It also puts communities in the neighboring state along the roadways
and railroads used to transport waste to the facility at risk, effectively exter-
nalizing the monitoring and emergency response costs.35
Other forms of physical interstate environmental harms are less obvious
but no less significant. One example is urban sprawl, the "dispersed, usually
car-dependent forms of urban growth that typically overlap multiple local
government jurisdictions. 3 6 Decisions made in one state can impose the
environmental and economic costs of urban sprawl on another state.37 While
sprawl is often considered a local government issue, it creates regional and
'9 See SAMUEL J. WILLIAMSON, FUNDAMENTALS OF AIR POLLUTION 219-25 (1973).
30 See Revesz, supra note 1, at 2351.
3' The upstream/downstream siting incentives may also apply in the air pollution context,
especially in locations where prevailing winds consistently blow in one direction. States may
have an incentive to induce air pollution sources to locate close to their downwind borders to
externalize the air pollution harms, although direct evidence of states providing such incen-
tives is lacking. See Revesz, supra note 1, at 2351, 2353.
32 See Daniel E. Ingberman, Siting Noxious Facilities: Are Markets Efficient?, 29 J.
ENVTL. EcON. & MGMT. 5-20, S-23 (1995). See also Bradford C. Mank, Environmental Jus-
tice and Discriminatory Siting: Risk-Based Representation and Equitable Compensation, 56
OHIO ST. L.J. 329, 421 (1995).
.1 Robert B. Wiygul & Sharon C. Harrington, Environmental Justice in Rural Communi-
ties Part One: RCRA, Communities, and Environmental Justice, 96 W. VA. L. REV. 405, 437-
38 (1993).
31 See id. at 409.
" See id. at 410.
36 Buzbee, supra note 9, at 10.
17 See id.
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national harms. 38 Many metropolitan areas have sprawled across state lines.
For example, according to 2000 Census figures, over thirty of the largest
metropolitan areas in the United States extend across state lines, including
those containing New York City, Chicago, Washington/Baltimore, Philadel-
phia, Boston, St. Louis, Portland (OR), Cincinnati, Kansas City (KS & MO),
Norfolk/Virginia Beach, and Las Vegas.3 9 These eleven metropolitan re-
gions are home to almost 62 million people, or approximately twenty per-
cent of the U.S. population.40
While this article is concerned primarily with physical interstate envi-
ronmental harms generated in one state and affecting another state, it is im-
portant to briefly describe three other types of interstate environmental
externalities. The first and most closely related is physical harm to common
resources which transcend multiple state boundaries. An obvious example
of this type of externality is the emission of greenhouse gases. Greenhouse
gas emissions from one state do not physically invade and directly harm
another state, but rather impact the common atmosphere with resulting
harms felt by all beneficiaries and users of that common resource (including
to some extent the source state). Like interstate pollution and other physical
interstate environmental harms, harm to common resources involves a physi-
cal harm produced by one state and impacting another state. However, the
key distinction is that harm to a commons implicates large numbers of states
- perhaps all fifty, such as in the greenhouse gas emissions example. Thus
physical harm to a commons presents very different legal and political chal-
lenges than physical interstate harms imposed by one state on one of its
neighbors.41 While this article is not intended to address protection and man-
agement of interstate commons, some of the analysis and recommendations
may be applicable. 42
The other two types of interstate environmental externalities are easy to
distinguish because the interstate harm is not physical, but pecuniary or psy-
3 See id. See also Lincoln L. Davies, Just a Big, 'Hot Fuss'? Assessing the Value of
Connecting Suburban Sprawl, Land Use, and Water Rights Through Assured Supply Laws, 34
ECOLOGY L.Q. __ (forthcoming 2008).
3' These cities are included in the following Metropolitan Statistical Areas ("MSAs") and
Consolidated Metropolitan Statistical Areas ("CMSAs"): New York - Northern New Jersey -
Long Island (NY, NJ, CT, PA CMSA), ranking 1; Chicago - Gary - Kenosha (IL, IN, WI
CMSA), ranking 3; Washington - Baltimore (DC, MD, VA, WV CMSA), ranking 4; Philadel-
phia - Wilmington - Atlantic City (PA, NJ, DE, MD CMSA), ranking 6; Boston - Worcester -
Lawrence (MA, NH, ME, CT CMSA), ranking 7; St. Louis (MO, IL MSA), ranking 18; Port-
land - Salem (OR, WA CMSA), ranking 23; Cincinnati - Hamilton (OH, KY, IN CMSA),
ranking 24; Kansas City (MO, KS MSA), ranking 26; Norfolk - Virginia Beach - Newport
News (VA, NC MSA), ranking 31; Las Vegas (NV, AZ MSA), ranking 32. CENSUS 2000
PHC-T-3. Ranking Tables for Metropolitan Areas: 1990 and 2000, tbl. 3: Metropolitan Areas
Ranked by Population: 2000 (U.S. Census Bureau, 2000).
4 id.
41 See Merrill, supra note 2, at 970.
42 For an excellent analysis of the problem of protecting a multi-jurisdictional commons,
see generally Buzbee, supra note 9.
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chological. 43 Pecuniary interstate environmental externalities occur through
interstate regulatory competition." If one state were to lower its environ-
mental standards, regulated businesses in other states may relocate or
threaten to relocate, setting off a "race to the bottom" between states com-
peting for the businesses.45 The merits of this theory and whether it is a
problem that justifies federal regulation are hotly debated in academic litera-
ture,46 and this article will not cover that well-worn ground. The key point
regarding this discussion is that the resulting harm to the other states would
be a loss of economic activity, or perhaps a lowering of their own environ-
mental standards. Professor Merrill distinguishes this "pecuniary spillover"
from "physical spillovers involved with transboundary pollution. '47 Part III
addresses the merits of requiring consideration of pecuniary spillovers in an
interstate environmental impact assessment, but this is a general problem
that should be treated separately from the physical interstate environmental
externalities that are the focus of this article.
Psychological interstate environmental externalities occur when one
state allows damage or harm to a resource within its territory that is valued
by the public in other states.48 The source state is not physically affecting
the citizens of another state with pollution or another environmental harm.49
Instead, the harm is psychological, as citizens of other states would be de-
prived of the enjoyment of visiting the unique resource or simply knowing
that it exists.50 For example, decisions to allow intense resource use in a
state park may upset citizens of another state that appreciate the park.5
Again, Part III briefly discusses the merits of requiring consideration of psy-
chological spillovers in an interstate environmental impact assessment, but
without a physical harm to another state, the sovereign interests of a state in
management of its public lands and resources caution against such
application.
41 1 do not mean to suggest that pecuniary and psychological interstate harms "are some-
how less 'real' than physical spillovers." Daniel C. Esty, Revitalizing Environmental Federal-
ism, 95 MicH. L. REV. 570, 594 (1996). However, these problems are different in nature and
warrant different legal and policy solutions.
4 See Merrill, supra note 2, at 968-70.
45 Id. at 969.
46 Compare Richard L. Revesz, Rehabilitating Interstate Competition: Rethinking the
"Race-to-the-Bottom" Rationale for Federal Environmental Regulation, 67 N.Y.U. L. REV.
1210 (1992) with Esty, supra note 43.
41 Merrill, supra note 2, at 969.
41 Professor Esty considers this problem a "choice of public" issue. See Esty, supra note
43, at 594.
" See Merrill, supra note 2, at 968 n.184.
50 See id.
' See, e.g., Cindi Lash, Lumber Firm Wants Use of Blackwater Falls State Park's Trail,
PIr-rSBURGH POST-GAZETrE, Nov. 5, 2006, available at http://www.post-gazette.com/pg/
06309/735778-85.stm (describing a dispute over a logging company's attempts to turn a trail
through Blackwater State Park, located in West Virginia, about three hours south of Pittsburgh,
into a logging road; the park and its environs are "a popular recreation and vacation area for
families and outdoors enthusiasts from West Virginia, Maryland, Pennsylvania and Washing-
ton, D.C.").
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B. The Conceptual Bases for Interstate Environmental Harms
Understanding the causes that lead to inefficient interstate environmen-
tal harms is critical to finding new solutions to this problem. These causes
can be categorized into four conceptual bases for interstate environmental
harms. First, some activities have environmental impacts which by their na-
ture disperse over a larger geographic area than a single state. These inter-
state environmental harms are essentially inevitable based on the geography
of the state and nature of the activity, and may not result from any decision-
making inefficiencies or incentives. Second, the concept of economic exter-
nalities plays out at the state level, as state decision-makers (including both
political leaders and agency staff) may seek to improve the economic inter-
ests of their citizens and industries but impose the economic costs of envi-
ronmental harms onto other states. Third, there is a public participation and
process bias that may cause state decision-makers to favor a project or activ-
ity that avoids public opposition from their constituents, even if the project
generates significant opposition in other states. Finally, there is an informa-
tion bias as most state decision-makers have better knowledge of their state
resources, and thus tend to better estimate and appreciate potential environ-
mental impacts within their state than impacts on other states. To best ad-
dress the problem of interstate environmental harms, it is important to
appreciate these separate but related conceptual bases in designing a poten-
tial solution.
Wherever there are state boundaries, there will be environmental harms
that cross those boundaries. Even if the state boundaries had no legal or
political importance, the nature of environmental harms would lead to trans-
boundary impacts. To demonstrate this point, consider that the U.S. Envi-
ronmental Protection Agency ("EPA") uses a rule of thumb that a source of
air pollution may cause air quality impacts up to fifty kilometers (approxi-
mately thirty-one miles) away.52 Rhode Island (admittedly the smallest state
in the union and perhaps an unfair subject to pick on for this geography
lesson) is only about forty miles long and thirty miles wide.53 Even if a
major air pollution source were located in the geographic center of the state,
it would almost inevitably impact air quality in other states. This illustrates
that to some extent interstate harms are inevitable based on the geography of
the states and the nature of the activity and harm, and would occur even
without any economic, legal, or political inefficiencies. These inevitable im-
pacts could be considered in a policy response to interstate environmental
harms, but they should not be the focus.
While the nature of environmental harms makes some interstate im-
pacts inevitable, the concept of externalities creates an obvious risk for exac-
52 See National Emission Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants, 43 Fed. Reg. 26,388,
26,398 (June 19, 1978).
" See The Geography of Rhode Island, http://www.netstate.com/states/geography/ri...ge-
ography.htm (last visited Oct. 16, 2007) (on file with the Harvard Environmental Law
Review).
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erbating the problem. Dean Richard Revesz has applied the economic view
of environmental externalities to interstate pollution incentives as follows:
the source state "obtains the labor and fiscal benefits of the economic activ-
ity that generates the pollution but does not suffer the full costs of the activ-
ity. Under these conditions, economic theory maintains that an undesirably
large amount of pollution will cross state lines. '54 The state decision-makers
are essentially taking on the economic interests of their constituents, seeking
to maximize internalized economic benefits and minimize internalized eco-
nomic costs. In doing so, states may engage in or permit activities that are
not economically justified from a total interstate economic perspective, cre-
ating an inefficiency based on the economic externality.
This economic perspective certainly illustrates an important aspect of
the problem, but it is incomplete. The costs being externalized by the source
state are not just economic. Public concern, negative media attention, even
demonstrations and protests often result from interstate pollution and envi-
ronmental harm." State decision-makers are motivated by these factors as
well as the internalized economic interests of their constituents and indus-
tries. Both elected officials and agency staff would typically prefer to avoid
the costs and risks associated with upset constituents, bad press, lengthy
meetings, and public protests.
Further, not all environmental harms (both intrastate and interstate) are
the result of economic externalities. Some environmental harms result from
inefficiencies or mistakes due to lack of information or path dependency.
6
While there is considerable debate about how often lack of information and
path dependency occurs in the private sector, the political nature of govern-
mental decision-making makes it a greater possibility.57 Even technically
proficient agency staff may be relatively uninformed about the internalized
and externalized costs of their decisions, particularly when those costs relate
4 See Revesz, supra note 1, at 2343.
5 See, e.g., Dan Shine, Groups to Fight Garbage Imports, DETROIT FREE PRESS, Feb. 10,
2003, at BI (reporting that nearly two dozen environmental, religious, and neighborhood
groups launched a campaign to stop dumping of out-of-state trash in Michigan); Jane Gordon,
Our Air, Their Air: Most of It Is Bad, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 10, 2002, § 14CN, at 1 (reporting that
Connecticut residents protested construction of a cement plant in Greenport, New York, whose
emissions would impact New England states). Professor Davies provides an excellent case
study of these issues in the context of the dispute between Virginia Governor James S. Gilmore
III and New York City Mayor Rudy Giuliani over trash importation. See Lincoln L. Davies, If
You Give the Court a Commerce Clause: An Environmental Justice Critique of Supreme Court
Interstate Waste Jurisprudence, II FORDHAM ENVTL. L. REV. 207, 280-89 (1999).56 See Esty, supra note 12, at 154 ("In broad terms, 'path dependence' means that an
outcome or decision is shaped in specific and systematic ways by the historical path leading to
it."); Oona A. Hathaway, Path Dependence in the Law: The Course and Pattern of Legal
Change in a Common Law System, 86 IOWA L. REV. 601, 603-04 (2001).
"' Compare Michael E. Porter & Claas van der Linde, Toward a New Conception of the
Environment-Competitiveness Relationship, 9 J. ECON. PERSP. 97 (Autumn 1995) (supporting
the notion of improving both economic and environmental outcomes through the use of inno-
vation) with Noah Walley & Bradley Whitehead, It's Not Easy Being Green, HARV. Bus. REV.,
May-June 1994, at 46 (arguing that there are very limited opportunities for improving environ-
mental outcomes without incurring economic costs).
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to matters beyond their expertise. For example, while a state highway de-
partment may do an excellent job accounting for costs associated with con-
struction and maintenance of a project, it may lack the expertise necessary to
understand the associated impacts on water quality or wildlife. Or, a state
agency may make a decision that benefits its interests, but harms interests
represented by other state agencies. Road salt presents a classic example of
such conflicting agency interests. State highway departments pay relatively
little for and get considerable benefits from ice-free roads. 8 However, the
true costs of road salting are externalized in the form of corrosion to vehi-
cles, damage to utility infrastructure, harm to surrounding vegetation, and
contamination of water supplies. 9
The likelihood of reducing both internalized and externalized costs with
better information is particularly strong in the context of actions with inter-
state impacts. Even a state that desires to minimize the environmental harms
of a project may grossly underestimate environmental harm in another state.
Awareness of potential environmental impacts depends upon knowledge of
the potentially affected resource. A state forester working for a state agency
may know her state forests intimately, providing a ready foundation for an-
ticipating potential environmental impacts from proposed projects. How-
ever, she would lack the same intimate knowledge of the forests in a
neighboring state (especially if the state has different ecosystem characteris-
tics), and may thus not fully account for potential environmental impacts in
the other jurisdiction. Similarly, the 'greenest' state politicians' (those most
politically committed to environmental protection and stewardship) love of
their state's natural resources may well be grounded in knowledge of those
same resources. A lack of knowledge about the natural resources in another
state may result in less attention to potential interstate environmental harms.
Putting aside incidental interstate environmental harms, interstate im-
pacts are externalized for financial, public process, and informational rea-
sons. These conceptual causes of interstate environmental harms -
financial externalities, public participation and process bias, and lack of in-
formation - can be described in summary as "political externalities." As
used in this article, the concept of political externalities relates to the com-
bined financial, public process, and information gathering costs associated
with decisions to conduct or allow an activity in one state that causes envi-
ronmental harms in another state.60 Thus, this article's concept of political
58 See ZYGMUNT J.B. PLATER, ET AL., ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND POLICY: NATURE, LAW,
AND SOCIETY 36-37 (2004) (citing Charles Wurster, Op-Ed, Of Salt .... N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 4,
1978, at A21).
59 Id.
6 It should be noted that this use of the term "political externality" differs substantively
from the term's usage in public choice theory scholarship, in which the term describes the costs
imposed on a dissident minority by the collective decisions of the majority within one political
system. See JAMES M. BUCHANAN & GORDON TULLOCK, THE CALCULUS OF CONSENT: LoGi-
CAL FOUNDATIONS OF A CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY 89 (1965) ("The member of the dissi-
dent minority suffers external effects of collective decisions enforced on him .... "). This
concept has been applied to environmental policymaking by Professor Zywicki in describing
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externalities builds on the basic premise described by Professor Richard
Stewart in the international setting that "nations will often fail to adopt ap-
propriate environmental standards because of a political externality; the
costs of more stringent standards will be borne by the nation adopting them,
whereas a significant portion of the benefits will go to those in other coun-
tries."'r Other scholars have referred to this concept with the terms "super
externality" 62 or simply "interstate spillovers. ' '63
Understanding interstate environmental hanns as a political externality
is important in evaluating potential solutions to the problem. Because the
problem is not just economic, establishing liability and compensation
schemes would not provide a complete solution. Instead, a policy solution
to interstate environmental harm must address the economic, public process,
and informational failures that lead to state decisions with unjustified (i.e.,
inefficient) interstate environmental impacts. These legal and policy re-
sponses are the subject of Parts II and III of this article.
II. RESPONSES TO POLITICAL EXTERNALITIES IN A FEDERALIST SYSTEM
An internalization of the political externalities of interstate environmen-
tal harms could be most fully accomplished by holding elected officials of
the source state accountable to the public of the receiving state. Obviously
that is not possible, so a more modest approach to bring political cost inter-
nalization to the source state is needed. The United States' federalist system
has been challenged by interstate environmental harms for over a century.
This Part first describes how all three branches of the federal government
have sought to address the problem through liability and regulatory regimes.
While these responses have provided some relief, the federal government
has achieved only limited success in addressing this problem. 64 This Part
then details how regional interstate efforts have fared no better than the fed-
the rent-seeking behavior of environmental advocacy groups that use their political power in
governmental lobbying to pursue their preferences while imposing the costs of those prefer-
ences on other individuals and firms. See Todd J. Zywicki, Environmental Externalities and
Political Externalities: The Political Economy of Environmental Regulation and Reform, 73
TUL. L. REV. 845, 856-74 (1999). See also Todd I. Zywicki, Baptists?: The Political Economy
of Environmental Interest Groups, 53 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 315, 318 (2002). The term "po-
litical externality" has also been used to describe the positive political and societal benefits of
civil disobedience. See Eric Neisser, Charging for Free Speech: User Fees and Insurance in
the Marketplace ofIdeas, 74 GEO. L.J. 257, 334 (1985). Most recently, the term "horizontal
political externalities" has been used to describe the situation when "political decisions impact
the electoral outcome or approval ratings of other political actors or levels of government that
were not involved in the decisionmaking." Ben Depoorter, Horizontal Political Externalities:
The Supply and Demand of Disaster Management, 56 DUKE L.J. 101, 109 (2006).
61 Richard B. Stewart, Environmental Regulation and International Competitiveness, 102
YALE L.J. 2039, 2054 (1993).
62 ANDR8 DUA & DANIEL C. ESTY, SUSTAINING THE ASIA PACIFIC MIRACLE: ENVIRON-
MENTAL PROTECTION AND ECONOMIC INTEGRATION 59-60 (2d ed. 1997).
See Adler, supra note 1, at 140.
I ld. at 160 ("The federal government is relatively absent when it comes to addressing
interstate spillovers").
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eral efforts. Despite a few compacts and agreements that seek to address the
problem, the political transaction costs of interstate compacts and agree-
ments are rarely overcome.
A. Federal Adjudication of Interstate Environmental Harms
The United States Supreme Court's first forays into environmental law
were to resolve interstate pollution disputes,65 and before the development of
modern statutory environmental law in the 1970s, the federal government's
primary tool for addressing interstate environmental harms was adjudication
of disputes between states. Pursuant to Article III of the United States Con-
stitution, the Supreme Court has original jurisdiction over disputes between
states.6 6 The Court has invoked this jurisdiction several times over the past
century to resolve interstate disputes over transboundary pollution and allo-
cation of transboundary waters, producing fact-specific rulings based on
vague and competing legal principles. 67 In recent decades, the Court has
become reluctant to exercise its jurisdiction over these technical and time-
consuming disputes.6" When it has exercised its jurisdiction, the Court's de-
cisions have focused on the preemption of federal common law by federal
regulatory statutes69 and the applicability of state common law to interstate
transboundary pollution.7 ° This Section briefly explores the difficulty and
challenges of the Supreme Court's adjudication of interstate environmental
disputes to demonstrate the need for additional legal solutions to this
problem. 7'
The Missouri v. Illinois72 cases gave the Supreme Court its first oppor-
tunity to consider a dispute over interstate environmental harms. Prior to
1900, Chicago's considerable sewerage, stockyard, and industrial wastes
were discharged into Lake Michigan via the Chicago River.73 In 1889, the
65 See, e.g., Georgia v. Tenn. Copper Co., 206 U.S. 230 (1907); Missouri v. Illinois, 200
U.S. 496 (1906) ("Missouri IF').
6 See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 2 ("In all Cases affecting Ambassadors, other public
Ministers and Consuls, and those in which a State shall be a Party, the supreme Court shall
have original Jurisdiction.").
67 See, e.g., Wisconsin v. Illinois, 278 U.S. 367 (1929); Georgia v. Tenn. Copper Co., 206
U.S. 230; Missouri H1, 200 U.S. 496; Kansas v. Colorado, 185 U.S. 125 (1902).
6 See Illinois v. City of Milwaukee, 406 U.S. 91 (1972); Ohio v. Wyandotte Chems.
Corp., 401 U.S. 493 (1971).
69 See City of Milwaukee v. Illinois, 451 U.S. 304 (1981).70 See Int'l Paper Co. v. Ouellette, 479 U.S. 481 (1987).
7' For excellent analyses of the Supreme Court's transboundary pollution case law, see
generally Robert V. Percival, The CWA and the Demise of the Federal Common Law of Inter-
state Nuisance, 55 ALA. L. REV. 717 (2004) and Thomas W. Merrill, Golden Rules for Trans-
boundary Pollution, 46 DUKE L.J. 931 (1997). For similarly excellent analyses of the Supreme
Court's interstate waters equitable apportionment case law, see generally A. Dan Tarlock, The
Law of Equitable Apportionment Revisited, Updated, and Restated, 56 U. COLO. L. Rav. 381,
392 (1985) and, more recently, Robert Haskell Abrams, Interstate Water Allocation: A Con-
temporary Primer for Eastern States, 25 U. ARK. LIrLE ROCK L. REv. 155 (2002).
72 Missouri 11, 200 U.S. 496; Missouri v. Illinois, 180 U.S. 208 (1901) ("Missouri I").
7' See Missouri 1, 180 U.S. at 212.
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State of Illinois created a Sanitary District which, acting as an agent of the
state, subsequently undertook several drainage projects involving the Chi-
cago River.7 4 One of these projects involved the construction of an artificial
channel, diverting the flow of the south branch of the Chicago River away
from its natural drainage into Lake Michigan and toward the Des Plaines
River, which in turn emptied into the Mississippi River via the Illinois
River.75
The State of Missouri, located downriver from the point at which the
Illinois River emptied into the Mississippi River, filed suit in the Supreme
Court alleging harm to Missouri towns and citizens situated on the Missis-
sippi River, and seeking an injunction against the use of the channel for
waste disposal purposes.7 6 The suit relied primarily on a common law theory
of nuisance, buttressed with a claim that Illinois was also violating riparian
principles by diverting water out of its natural watershed.77 Missouri was
primarily concerned that Illinois' waste was causing typhoid fever deaths
among Missouri citizens. Illinois responded by filing a demurrer alleging
both lack of jurisdiction under the Constitution's Article III "case or contro-
versy" requirement and lack of adequate pleading.
In its initial decision (Missouri I), the Court focused primarily on
whether it could legitimately exercise jurisdiction over the states' dispute.
The Missouri I Court engaged in a thorough review of the history, develop-
ment, and interpretation of Article III of the U.S. Constitution. The Court
determined that because partial relinquishment by the individual states of
their sovereign powers concerning war and diplomacy was necessary for the
establishment of a united and federalist nation, the U.S. Supreme Court must
necessarily furnish a forum for the resolution of disputes between states. 9
The Court noted that an alternative method for resolving interstate disputes
had previously been described in the Articles of Confederation, but Article
III of the Constitution vested this function in the judiciary. 0 The Court's
analysis is consistent with an account in the Federalist papers, which noted
that while border controversies between the states may have been the pri-
mary concern of the Framers, they also recognized that the Court would hear
other forms of interstate disputes."
7 4 See id. at 210, 241-42.
7See Missouri H, 200 U.S. at 517; Missouri 1, 180 U.S. at 208, 212.7 6 See Missouri H, 200 U.S. at 510; Missouri 1, 180 U.S. at 216.
77See Missouri H1, 200 U.S. at 526; Missouri 1, 180 U.S. at 212. The Court ultimately
decided the case on the merits of the nuisance claim, and did not entertain the riparian diver-
sion allegation as a sufficient basis for the suit.7
1See Missouri !, 180 U.S. at 216-18.79 Id. at 241.
80 The Ninth Article of the Articles of Confederation had provided for a tribunal method
of state-state dispute resolution, whereby the offended state would petition Congress to assem-
ble the functional equivalent of an arbitration panel to hear and decide the controversy. See
id., 180 U.S. at 220-21. See also U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1; Judiciary Act of 1789, Ch. 20,
§13, 1 Stat. 73, 80.
81 THE FEDERALIST No. 80, at 404 (Alexander Hamilton) (Buccaneer Books, 1992)
("[T]here are many other sources, besides interfering claims of boundary, from which bicker-
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The Court's constitutional interpretation notwithstanding, it was still
wary of having its jurisdiction invoked in circumstances other than those in
which "States are in direct antagonism as States. '8 2 This holding became
the first jurisdictional standard for the Supreme Court to hear an interstate
environmental dispute. The Missouri II court subsequently confirmed the
Missouri I jurisdictional requirements of state action and direct antagonism,
and added two additional requirements. First, the case must "be of serious
magnitude, clearly and fully proved."83 Second, the case must be suscepti-
ble to judicial resolution. 84 Harm to any of a state's traditional sovereign
interests, such as the property, health, safety, and welfare of its citizens,
would provide a sufficient basis for suit against another state.8 5 Addition-
ally, indirect action by a state or direct action by a state's entity or subdivi-
sion (e.g., the Chicago Sanitary District) would satisfy the state action
requirement.8 6
With the Court's jurisdiction established, the Missouri II court ad-
dressed the substantive merits of Missouri's nuisance claim. Ultimately, as
in so many environmental disputes, Missouri's claim was undermined by the
lack of technical and scientific certainty regarding its allegations. Writing
for the Court, Justice Holmes first noted the technical complexity of this
environmental dispute compared to traditional nuisance actions: "There is
no pretence that there is a nuisance of the simple kind that was known to the
older common law. There is nothing which can be detected by the unas-
sisted senses - no visible increase of filth, no new smell."87 Instead, Mis-
souri's case "depends upon an inference of the unseen." 8 The technical
complexity of determining causation and harm from a remote source in an-
other state was the key theme of the Court's decision. This theme has been
repeated in federal adjudications of interstate environmental disputes over
the past century.
Justice Holmes began by assuming Missouri's "now-prevailing scien-
tific explanation of typhoid fever to be correct."89 He then detailed the two
additional key inferences that Missouri's case relied upon. First, that inci-
dents of typhoid fever had increased "considerably" since Illinois' discharge
and that any such increases could not be explained by other factors.90 Sec-
ond, "that the bacillus of typhoid can and does survive the journey and reach
the intake of St. Louis in the Mississippi. 9 1
ings and animosities may spring up among the members of the union .... Whatever practices
may have a tendency to disturb the harmony between the states, are proper objects of federal
superintendence and control.").
82 Missouri 1, 180 U.S. at 249 (Fuller, C.J., dissenting).
8 Missouri H, 200 U.S. at 521.
See id.
85 See Missouri 1, 180 U.S. at 236-37, 241.
86See id. at 237-38, 241.
17 Missouri 11, 200 U.S. at 522.
88 Id.
89 Id. at 523.
9 See id. at 522-23.
9' Id. at 523.
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Regarding the alleged increase in typhoid fever, Justice Holmes noted
that even the "data upon which an increase in the deaths from typhoid fever
in St. Louis is alleged are disputed."9 Missouri's brief listed the deaths from
typhoid fever in St. Louis before and after Illinois' discharges began, but
Illinois countered that "the numbers for the later years have been enlarged
by carrying over cases which in earlier years would have been put into a
miscellaneous column (intermittent, remittent, typho-malaria, etc., etc.). 93
Further, Illinois claimed that other causes, including waste from within Mis-
souri, were to blame for any actual increase in typhoid-related deaths.
94
The technical complexity of causation was significantly compounded
by uncertainty regarding the effects of the long distance (357 miles) from
Chicago to St. Louis.95 "The experts differ as to the time and distance
within which a stream would purify itself. No case of an epidemic caused
by infection at so remote a source is brought forward, and the cases which
are produced are controverted."96 The parties disputed the time for pollu-
tants to travel the distance based on experiments with floats as "varying
from eight to eighteen and a half days, with forty-eight hours more from
intake to distribution. '97 Predictably, Missouri's experts claimed that the ty-
phoid bacillus could nonetheless "keep its power for twenty-five days or
more," while Illinois' experts opined that a typhoid bacillus could not sur-
vive the time and distance. 98
Ultimately, the Court held that Missouri could not show adequate proof
of causation because the scientific evidence presented could not establish
Illinois' discharge of sewage into the Chicago River as the sole or primary
source of pollution in the Mississippi River.99 Justice Holmes's conclusion
relies on two themes repeated throughout the opinion: technical complexity
regarding novel scientific issues and the complication of potentially harmful
conduct by the plaintiff state itself (cities in Missouri also discharged waste
to waterways). While the case is now a century old, the Court's struggle
with technical complexity, scientific uncertainty regarding distant causation,
and complicating conduct in the affected state has continued to this day.?°
92 Id.
93 Id. at 523-24.
94 See id. at 522-26.
91 Id. at 523.
96 Id.97 Id.
98 Id.
99 Id. at 526.
"I" For example, the Court's difficulty in understanding complex scientific issues involving
causation and its reluctance to address environmental claims was humorously displayed in the
recent oral argument before the Court in Massachusetts v. EPA, 127 S. Ct. 1438 (2007). Jus-
tice Scalia referred to the situation in which carbon dioxide "leaves the air and goes up into the
stratosphere." Counsel for petitioners responded: "Respectfully, Your Honor, it is not the
stratosphere. It's the troposphere." Justice Scalia: "Troposphere, whatever. I told you before
I'm not a scientist." (Laughter.) "That's why I don't want to have to deal with global warm-
ing, to tell you the truth." Transcript of Oral Argument at 22-23, Massachusetts v. EPA, 127 S.
Ct. 1438 (2007) (No. 05-1120).
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To be fair, affected states and their citizens can overcome these chal-
lenges and prevail in interstate environmental harm disputes before the Su-
preme Court. For example, the Georgia v. Tennessee Copper Company and
Ducktown Sulphur, Copper & Iron Company'0' cases followed closely on
the heels of the Missouri cases with very different results. The state of
Georgia, pursuant to direction from the Georgia legislature and Governor,
filed suit in the United States Supreme Court to enjoin two copper compa-
nies located and operated in the state of Tennessee from discharging noxious
gases that were contaminating property located in Georgia. 02 Although the
State of Georgia did not actually own much of the property that was harmed
by the gases, the Court nonetheless recognized Georgia's standing as sover-
eign to bring suit:
This is a suit by a State for an injury to it in its capacity of quasi-
sovereign. In that capacity the State has an interest independent of
and behind the titles of its citizens, in all the earth and air within
its domain. It has the last word as to whether its mountains shall be
stripped of their forests and its inhabitants shall breathe pure
air .... When the States by their union made the forcible abate-
ment of outside nuisances impossible to each, they did not thereby
agree to submit to whatever might be done. They did not renounce
the possibility of making reasonable demands on the ground of
their still remaining quasi-sovereign interests; and the alternative
to force is a suit in this court. 03
The fact that the defendants were private entities who were not govern-
mentally affiliated with the State of Tennessee did not disqualify the suit,
because Georgia had previously petitioned the State of Tennessee for relief,
and because Georgia's sovereign character was sufficient to meet the juris-
dictional requirements of Article III.104 Neither was Georgia defeated on a
theory of laches, as the Court found that Georgia had allowed a reasonable
period of time for defendants to pursue efforts to reduce the emissions, or,
alternatively, to show that their emissions were not the source of the harm
suffered. 05 The Court ultimately granted injunctive relief limiting the de-
fendants' emissions. °6
The Court has also resolved disputes regarding interstate environmental
harms other than those to transboundary waters. 10 7 One of these disputes,
"o1 Georgia v. Tenn. Copper Co., 237 U.S. 474 (1915) ("Georgia If'); Georgia v. Tenn.
Copper Co., 206 U.S. 230 (1907).
112 Georgia 1, 206 U.S. at 236.
103 Id. at 237.
"o See id. at 236-39.
'o5 See id. at 239. See also Georgia II, 237 U.S. at 475-76.
"o See Georgia 11, 237 U.S. at 477-78.
107 Most notably, the Supreme Court has allocated shared interstate waters under its doc-
trine of equitable apportionment, which considers the relevant state water use laws and equity
concerning the competing states. See, e.g., Wyoming v. Colorado, 259 U.S. 419 (1922); Kan-
sas v. Colorado, 206 U.S. 46 (1907). See also Tarlock, supra note 71; Abrams, supra note 71.
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Wisconsin v. Illinois,0 involves the same Chicago diversion that was the
subject of litigation in Missouri v. Illinois. After Illinois prevailed against
Missouri regarding the discharged pollution, Wisconsin, Michigan, New
York and other Great Lakes states brought another suit in the Supreme Court
against Illinois. These complainant states alleged that the Chicago diversion
had lowered levels in Lake Michigan, as well as Lakes Huron, Erie, and
Ontario, by more than six inches, harming navigation and causing serious
injury to their citizens and property.' °9 Illinois again denied that the diver-
sion caused any actual injury.110
Recognizing the need for assistance in handling the complex technical
issues being raised, the Court appointed former Justice and Secretary of
State Charles Evan Hughes to serve as special master."' His report found
that Chicago's diversion lowered the levels of Lakes Michigan and Huron by
six inches and Lakes Erie and Ontario by five inches, 1 2 causing damage "to
navigation and commercial interests, to structures, to the convenience of
summer resorts, to fishing and hunting grounds, to public parks and other
enterprises, and to riparian property generally.""' 3 The Court adopted the
special master's report, concluding that the reduced lake levels caused the
complainant states and their citizens and property owners "great losses.'' 14
While generally supporting the claims of the complainant states, the Court
recognized the public health implications and economic costs that would
come with immediately halting the entire Chicago diversion." 5 The Court
thus referred the matter back to the special master for determination of the
proper relief." 6 The special master's report recommended a phased reduc-
tion in the Chicago diversion, allowing the city time to build adequate sew-
age treatment. The Court again adopted the special master's
recommendations to ultimately limit the size of the diversion."7
The above cases demonstrate the two major challenges for the Court in
adjudicating interstate environmental harm disputes. The first is the legal
"08 Wisconsin v. Illinois, 449 U.S. 48 (1980) ("Wisconsin V/"); Wisconsin v. Illinois, 388
U.S. 426 (1967) ("Wisconsin V'); Wisconsin v. Illinois, 289 U.S. 395 (1933) ("Wisconsin
IV"); Wisconsin v. Illinois, 281 U.S. 696 (1930) ("Wisconsin IF'); Wisconsin v. Illinois, 281
U.S. 179 (1930) ("Wisconsin If'); Wisconsin v. Illinois, 278 U.S. 367 (1929) ("Wisconsin ").
" See Wisconsin I, 278 U.S. at 399-400.
0I0 See id. at 400.
1 See id. at 399. Hughes was originally appointed to the Supreme Court in 1910, but left
the Court in 1916 to make a run for President. From 1921 to 1925, Hughes served as Secretary
of State under President Warren G. Harding.
112 See id. at 407.
113 Id. at 408.
114 Id. at 409.
... See id. at 420-21.
'
6 See id. at 421.
117 See Wisconsin I1, 281 U.S. at 198, 201. See also Wisconsin III, 281 U.S. at 697. Sub-
sequent litigation in the Supreme Court continued over several decades regarding Illinois' com-
pliance with the diversion reduction schedule and the amount of water allowed for domestic
pumping, with the ultimate result being that the total allowable diversion was increased to
3200 cubic feet per second, the level at which it is now capped. See Wisconsin VI, 449 U.S.
48 Wisconsin V, 388 U.S. at 427; Wisconsin IV, 289 U.S. 395.
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challenge of balancing competing interests of state sovereignty. Source
states argue for a sovereign right to regulate (or not regulate) polluting or
other environmentally harmful activities within their borders as they see fit.
Affected states argue for a sovereign right to be free of unwanted and harm-
ful pollution or other negative environmental impacts from another state.
The Court's numerous statements recognizing conflicting state sovereignty
interests nonetheless leave uncertainty about how to reconcile these in
practice." 8
The Court first set forth the tension of competing interests in state sov-
ereignty in the context of interstate environmental harm disputes in Kansas
v. Colorado,"9 which involved competing claims to use of a shared water
resource:
One cardinal rule, underlying all the relations of the States to each
other, is that of equality of right. Each State stands on the same
level with all the rest. It can impose its own legislation on no one
of the others, and is bound to yield its own views to none. Yet,
whenever ... the action of one State reaches through the agency of
natural laws into the territory of another State, the question of the
extent and the limitations of the rights of the two States becomes a
matter of justiciable dispute between them, and this court is called
upon to settle that dispute in such a way as will recognize the
equal rights of both and at the same time establish justice between
them. In other words, through these successive disputes and deci-
sions this court is practically building up what may not improperly
be called interstate common law. 20
A few cases and decades later, Justice Holmes was not able to offer any
clearer statement regarding the competing interests of state sovereignty in
New Jersey v. New York,' 2' another decision involving competing claims to
use of a shared water resource:
New York has the physical power to cut off all the water within its
jurisdiction. But clearly the exercise of such a power to the de-
struction of the interest of lower States could not be tolerated.
And on the other hand equally little could New Jersey be permitted
to require New York to give up its power altogether in order that
the river might come down to it undiminished. Both States have
real and substantial interests in the River that must be reconciled
as best they may be. 2
'18 See Merrill, supra note 2, at 944-46 (describing the Court's principles in these disputes
as elusive).
119 206 U.S. 46 (1907).
120 Id. at 97-98.
121 283 U.S. 336 (1931).
122 Id. at 342-43.
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The law in this area is no clearer now than at the time of these cases.
This is due to the second major challenge for the Court in adjudicating inter-
state environmental harm disputes. These cases are highly fact specific, and
often hinge on competing arguments over technical and scientific uncer-
tainty. Perhaps for this reason, the Court has been extremely reluctant to
hear interstate environmental disputes'23 and has relied on federal statutory
preemption to avoid making substantive decisions on competing state sover-
eignty interests. 2 4
The Court has made clear its lack of interest and competence in decid-
ing interstate environmental disputes. Writing for the majority in Ohio v.
Wyandotte Chemicals Corp.,'25 which declined to exercise the Court's juris-
diction over Ohio's transboundary pollution claims, Justice Harlan stated that
"[h]istory reveals that the course of this Court's prior efforts to settle dis-
putes regarding interstate air and water pollution has been anything but
smooth."'' 26 Justice Harlan further noted that Justice Holmes in Missouri v.
Illinois was "at pains to underscore the great difficulty that the Court faced
in attempting to pronounce a suitable general rule of law to govern such
controversies."' 27 Justice Harlan also recognized that the legal challenge of
interstate environmental cases is complicated and perhaps eclipsed by the
technical and scientific challenges:
The nature of the case Ohio brings here is equally disconcerting.
It can fairly be said that what is in dispute is not so much the law
as the facts. And the factfinding process we are asked to under-
take is, to say the least, formidable. . . . Indeed, Ohio is raising
factual questions that are essentially ones of first impression to the
scientists. The notion that appellate judges, even with the assis-
tance of a most competent Special Master, might appropriately un-
dertake at this time to unravel these complexities is, to say the
least, unrealistic. Nor would it suffice to impose on Ohio an un-
usually high standard of proof. That might serve to mitigate our
personal difficulties in seeking a just result that comports with
sound judicial administration, but would not lessen the complexity
of the task of preparing responsibly to exercise our judgment, or
the serious drain on the resources of this Court it would entail.'28
123 See Illinois v. City of Milwaukee, 406 U.S. 91 (1972); Ohio v. Wyandotte Chems.
Corp., 401 U.S. 493 (1971).
124 See City of Milwaukee v. Illinois, 451 U.S. 304, 317 (1981) ("Congress has not left the
formulation of appropriate federal standards to the courts through application of often vague
and indeterminate nuisance concepts and maxims of equity jurisprudence, but rather has occu-
pied the field through the establishment of a comprehensive regulatory program supervised by
an expert administrative agency.").
125 401 U.S. 493 (1971).
26 ld. at 501.
1
2 7 Id.
128 Id. at 503-04.
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Given the technical and scientific questions inherent in an interstate
environmental dispute, Justice Harlan made clear that the Supreme Court
should not be in the business of deciding such cases. He recognized that
"this Court has found even the simplest sort of interstate pollution case an
extremely awkward vehicle to manage."' 29 Resolving interstate environmen-
tal disputes requires a range of skills, including "factfinding, conciliation,
detailed coordination with - and perhaps not infrequent deference to -
other adjudicatory bodies, and close supervision of the technical perform-
ance of local industries."' 30 Justice Harlan readily admitted that the Supreme
Court has "no claim to such expertise or reason to believe that, were we to
adjudicate this case, and others like it, we would not have to reduce drasti-
cally our attention to those controversies for which this Court is a proper and
necessary forum."' 3'
The Supreme Court was envisioned by the Framers as the forum for
resolving interstate disputes. Yet Justice Harlan's opinion makes clear that
the Court does not want the job, especially when technical and scientific
uncertainty dominates these disputes. Justice Scalia's comments at the recent
Massachusetts v. EPA oral argument demonstrate that this view continues
today. 3 2 The Court has instead encouraged legislative solutions and inter-
state bargaining to avoid the need for adjudication of interstate environmen-
tal disputes.'33 As discussed further in this Part, citizens affected by
interstate environmental harms have taken the Court's not-so-subtle hints
and looked to other branches of the federal government and interstate com-
pacts and agreements to address these problems. However, both federal leg-
islation and regulation and regional interstate compacts and agreements have
provided little relief. If states would address the technical and scientific
questions raised in interstate environmental disputes in a publicly accounta-
ble forum, the Court would be better able, and as dicussed in Part III, per-
haps more willing, to use its legal expertise to decide these cases.
B. Federal Regulation of Interstate Environmental Harms
Even the staunchest scholarly advocates of state primacy and federal
devolution for environmental law concede that interstate environmental
harms necessitate a regulatory role for the federal government. 3 4 For these
129 Id. at 504.
130 Id. at 505.
131 Id. at 505.
132 See supra note 100.
133 See Wyandotte Chems., 401 U.S. at 502-03. See also New York v. New Jersey, 256
U.S. 296, 313 (1921) ("We cannot withhold the suggestion, inspired by the consideration of
this case, that the grave problem of sewage disposal presented by the large and growing popu-
lations living on the shores of New York Bay is one more likely to be wisely solved by co-
operative study and by conference and mutual concession on the part of representatives of the
states so vitally interested in it than by proceedings in any court however constituted.").
' See Revesz, supra note 1, at 2346; Adler, supra note 1, at 140; Butler & Macey, supra
note 13, at 42.
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scholars, federal environmental policy should begin, and perhaps end, with
addressing interstate environmental harms.'35 This sentiment is reflected to
some extent in the actions of federal lawmakers, as the federal environmen-
tal regulatory statutes of the 1970s were premised at least in part'3 6 on the
need to address interstate pollution.'37 This Section focuses on the Clean Air
Act ("CAA")' 35 and the Clean Water Act ("CWA"), 139 as these are the two
federal environmental statutes that most directly relate to interstate pollu-
tion.' 40 These statutes have certainly reduced total levels of air and water
pollution, respectively. However, they have had only limited success in spe-
cifically addressing interstate pollution, and in some circumstances may
have actually exacerbated the problem.
The federal CAA is "the statute designed to deal with the pollution that
gives rise to the most serious problems of interstate externalities."' 41 The
CAA begins with Congress' stated finding "that the predominant part of the
Nation's population is located in its rapidly expanding metropolitan and
other urban areas, which generally cross the boundary lines of local jurisdic-
tions and often extend into two or more States."' 142 The centerpieces of the
CAA are the National Ambient Air Quality Standards ("NAAQSs"), which
are set by EPA to provide nationally uniform maximum concentrations of
pollutants in order to protect public health and welfare. 43 The NAAQSs are
intended to be met through a combination of federal standards for new sta-
tionary sources (e.g., factories and power plants) and mobile sources (e.g.,
automobiles and trucks) and state implementation plans for existing station-
ary sources.144
The CAA has significantly reduced air pollution from both stationary
and mobile sources. 45 However, it might be a mistake to assume that these
'15 See Revesz, supra note 1, at 2346 (arguing that federal regulatory efforts should be
focused on the problem of interstate environmental externalities); Adler, supra note 1, at 140
("The strongest case for federal involvement comes in the context of interstate spillovers, such
as when pollution crosses state lines and the affected states are unable to resolve the conflict
on their own."); Butler & Macey, supra note 13, at 53 ("Interstate externalities are the only
area where federal regulation may be superior to local regulation.").
136 The other primary rationales for federalization of environmental law address the 'race-
to-the-bottom' phenomenon and advance public choice theory. See Revesz, supra note 46, at
1211-12.
'31 See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 740 1(a)(1) (2000) (discussed below).
138 Id. § 7401.
139 33 U.S.C. § 1251 (2000).
40 See Merrill, supra note 2, at 954.
'41 See Revesz, supra note 1, at 2344.
142 42 U.S.C. § 7401(a)(1).
'1 See id. § 7408.
See id. §§ 7410-11, 7521.
145 By 1990, the CAA had resulted in a 40 percent reduction in sulfur dioxide emissions
from electric utilities and a 75 percent reduction in total suspended particulate emissions from
industrial and utility smokestacks. In addition, the CAA was largely responsible for a 50
percent reduction in carbon monoxide emissions, a 30 percent reduction in emissions of nitro-
gen oxides, a 45 percent reduction in emissions of volatile organic compounds, and a near
elimination of lead emissions from motor vehicles. These reductions were achieved during a
period in which population grew by 22.3 percent and the national economy grew by 70 per-
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aggregate reductions in air pollution have resulted in reduced interstate air
pollution. The total amount of air pollution is just one of several factors that
lead to interstate air pollution. The height of the smokestack (for stationary
sources) and the locations of the air pollution emissions relative to state
boundaries and prevailing winds are also significant factors. 46 While the
CAA contains several provisions intended to address these additional fac-
tors, these provisions have not been very effective. For example, the CAA
limits reliance on tall smokestacks to achieve the NAAQSs in a region, 47
since tall smokestacks simply disperse the pollution to other regions. 48
However, the CAA's tall-stack provisions have failed to reduce the obvious
incentives for states to continue using tall smokestacks to externalize pollu-
tion harms on other states and have instead exacerbated such incentives. 49
The CAA has two other provisions intended to address interstate air
pollution. Section 1 10(a)(2)(D) requires state implementation plans to pro-
hibit "any source or other type of emissions activity within the State from
emitting any air pollutant in amounts which will... contribute significantly
to nonattainment in, or interfere with maintenance by, any other State with
respect to [NAAQSs]". 5 0 This provision is complemented by section
126(b), which authorizes any state or political subdivision to petition the
EPA Administrator "for a finding that any major source or group of station-
ary sources emits or would emit any air pollutant in violation of [section
7410(a)(2)(D)(ii)]". '5'
To date, only one instance exists in which section 126 was effectively
utilized to address interstate air pollution. In February 1998, eight states peti-
tioned EPA under section 126 for relief from NOx emissions originating in
southeastern and mid-western states. 15 2 After the state petitioners filed suit
to compel EPA to act, EPA and the state petitioners reached a settlement
agreement in March 1998 that set out a timetable for EPA action. 53 EPA
eventually responded to the petitions by issuing a rule to control NOx emis-
sions. The final version of the rule, issued in January 2000, included the
implementation of a NOx market-based trading program. 54 The rule was
subsequently challenged by upwind power companies and others, but with-
stood judicial review with only two aspects of the rule remanded for further
cent. See EPA, FINAL REPORT TO CONGRESS ON THE BENEFITS AND COSTS OF THE CAA, 1970
TO 1990, EPA-410-R-97-002 (1997), at 8, 15, 26, 55.
146 See Revesz, supra note 1, at 2351.
4 See 42 U.S.C. § 7423(a)(1). See also Natural Res. Def. Council v. EPA, 489 F.2d 390,
406-11 (5th Cir. 1974), rev'd on other grounds sub nom. Train v. Natural Res. Def. Council,
421 U.S. 60 (1975).
148 See Revesz, supra note 1, at 2351.
'49 See id. at 2355-58.
15042 U.S.C. § 7410(a)(2)(D)(i).
1-5 Id. § 7426(b).
152 Arnold W. Reitze, Jr., State and Federal Command-and-Control Regulation of Emis-
sions From Fossil-Fuel Electric Power Generating Plants, 32 ENVTL. L. 369, 410-11 (2002).
' See id. at 411; Proposed Settlement Agreement, 63 Fed. Reg. 10,874, 10,875 (March 5,
1998).
' Appalachian Power Co. v. EPA, 249 F.3d 1032, 1036, 1039 (D.C. Cir. 2001).
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justification by EPA.'55 This success, however, should be viewed in light of
other failed attempts by states to use the CAA to address interstate air
pollution.'56
Efforts to address interstate water pollution under the CWA have not
fared much better. The CWA seeks to create a partnership between the
states and the federal government "to restore and maintain the chemical,
physical, and biological integrity of the Nation's waters.' 5 7 To achieve this
goal, the CWA relies primarily on two regulatory mechanisms. "Effluent
limitations" are promulgated by EPA and use technological standards to re-
strict the quantities, rates, and concentrations of specified substances which
are discharged from point sources. 58 To supplement the effluent limitations,
"water quality standards" are typically promulgated by the states and estab-
lish the desired condition of a waterway. 59 The water quality standards are
needed because "numerous point sources, despite individual compliance
with effluent limitations, may [require] further regulat[ion] to prevent
water quality from falling below acceptable levels."' 6 In addition, water
quality standards consider the cumulative impact of non-point sources, such
as agricultural run-off and erosion from timber harvesting.' 6' These mecha-
nisms are enforced primarily through National Pollutant Discharge Elimina-
tion System ("NPDES") permits, which are generally required for any point
source discharge of pollution into a navigable body of water. 61
The CWA authorizes each state to establish "its own permit program
for discharges into navigable waters within its jurisdiction."'' 63 These state
permit programs should provide an opportunity to address interstate water
pollution. EPA can refuse to authorize state permit programs that do not
insure that other states with potentially affected waters, as well as the public,
"receive notice of each application for a permit and . ..opportunity for
public hearing before a ruling on each such application."' 64 State permit
programs must further "insure that any State ... whose waters may be af-
fected by the issuance of a permit may submit written recommendations to
the permitting State" and to the EPA Administrator. 65 Finally, "if any part
of such written recommendations are not accepted by the permitting State
... the permitting State will notify such affected State (and the Administra-
55 Id. at 1067-68.
156 See Revesz, supra note 1, at 2362-74; New York v. EPA, 852 F.2d 574, 581 (D.C. Cir.
1988) (Ginsburg, J., concurring). See also Merrill, supra note 2, at 960 ("The consistent los-
ing streak of plaintiff states ... under the CAA suggests that even express statutory causes of
action for transboundary pollution are of limited utility.").
157 33 U.S.C. § 125 1(a) (2000).
'58See id. §§ 1311, 1314.
'59See id. § 1313.
11 EPA v. California ex rel. State Water Res. Control Bd., 426 U.S. 200, 205 n.12 (1976).
161 See Pronsolino v. Nastri, 291 F.3d 1123 (9th Cir. 2002).
'
62 See 33 U.S.C. 88 1311 (a), 1342, 1362(12).
163 Id. § 1342(b).
1- Id. § 1342(b)(3).
165 Id. § 1342(b)(5).
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tor) in writing of its failure to so accept such recommendations together with
its reasons for so doing."' 66
The CWA thus provides a consultative process which, in theory, would
resolve many interstate water pollution disputes. The Supreme Court has
recognized that "[ajlthough these provisions do not authorize the down-
stream State to veto the issuance of a permit for a new point source in an-
other State, the Administrator retains authority to block the issuance of any
state-issued permit that is 'outside the guidelines and requirements' of the
Act."'67 In effect, EPA should act as an arbitrator of interstate disputes. This
process was described by the Supreme Court in International Paper Co. v.
Ouellette:
While source States have a strong voice in regulating their own
pollution, the [CWA] contemplates a much lesser role for States
that share an interstate waterway with the source (the affected
States). Even though it may be harmed by the discharges, an af-
fected State only has an advisory role in regulating pollution that
originates beyond its borders. Before a federal permit may be is-
sued, each affected State is given notice and the opportunity to
object to the proposed standards at a public hearing. An affected
State has similar rights to be consulted before the source State is-
sues its own permit; the source State must send notification, and
must consider the objections and recommendations submitted by
other States before taking action. Significantly, however, an af-
fected State does not have the authority to block the issuance of
the permit if it is dissatisfied with the proposed standards. An af-
fected State's only recourse is to apply to the [EPA] Administra-
tor, who then has the discretion to disapprove the permit if he
concludes that the discharges will have an undue impact on inter-
state waters.'6
If an impasse develops between EPA and a source state with an ap-
proved permit program, EPA can retake jurisdiction and issue its own per-
mit.169 Affected states are given additional power over discharges in source
states by a federal regulation that prohibits the issuance of a discharge per-
mit "when the imposition of conditions cannot ensure compliance with the
applicable water quality standards [including antidegradation policies] of all
affected states."' 70 This regulation was upheld by the Supreme Court in Ar-
kansas v. Oklahoma'7' on the ground that federally approved water quality
standards become federal law that preempts conflicting state regulations.
The Court stated that "[l]imits on an affected State's direct participation in
166Id.
167 Arkansas v. Oklahoma, 503 U.S. 91, 102 (1992) (citing 33 U.S.C. § 1342(d)(2)).
168 679 U.S. 481, 490-91 (citations omitted).
169 33 U.S.C. § 1342(d)(4).
170 40 C.F.R. § 122.4(d) (2007).
"1 503 U.S. at 92.
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permitting decisions... do not in any way constrain the EPA's authority to
require a point source to comply with downstream water quality
standards."'72
The interstate water pollution scheme provided by the CWA thus ap-
pears to thoroughly address the problem while respecting state sovereignty.
Unfortunately, this is a leading example of the "law in books" differing
from the "law in action."'73 As described by Professor Merrill, "[w]hen we
look beneath the surface of ... domestic statutes, the 'law in action' with
respect to transboundary pollution reflects something considerably less im-
pressive. "174 EPA has rarely taken formal action on interstate water pollu-
tion pursuant to the CWA. 175 This is likely because "the Environmental
Protection Agency, like other federal agencies, is reluctant to take on heated
interstate controversies."'7 6 This suggests that relying on the federal govern-
ment, and specifically on federal agencies, to resolve contentious interstate
environmental impact disputes may not be the most politically realistic solu-
tion, regardless of statutory authority. 177
C. Bargained Internalization Through Interstate Compacts
Neither federal adjudication nor federal regulation have provided a con-
sistent and reliable mechanism to force internalization of interstate environ-
mental harms. The failure to address the problem through vertical
federalism (with the federal government imposing a solution on the states)
has been mirrored by a failure to address the problem through horizontal
federalism (with states imposing a solution on themselves). States certainly
have the constitutional authority to regulate interstate environmental harms
between themselves through interstate compacts approved by Congress.
However, the nature of interstate environmental harms and the political
172 Id. at 106.
'71 See Merrill, supra note 2, at 937 (citing Roscoe Pound, Law in Books and Law in
Action, 44 Am. L. REV. 12, 15 (1910)).
114 Id. at 957-58.
175 While rare, EPA has on occasion objected to a state-issued permit to protect another
state's water quality pursuant to the CWA. See Champion Int'l Corp. v. EPA, 648 F. Supp.
1390, 1394 (W.D.N.C. 1986) (permitting EPA to object to a permit issued to a paper mill by
North Carolina to protect water quality in Tennessee), rev'd, vacated and remanded, 850 F.2d
182 (4th Cir. 1988); City of Albuquerque v. Browner, 865 F. Supp. 733, 736 (D.N.M. 1993)
(upholding EPA approval of the water quality standards of an Indian tribe (recognized as state
under the CWA) that had imposed limitations on discharges by an upstream state and
municipality).
176 Richard B. Stewart, Interstate Resource Conflicts: The Role of the Federal Courts, 6
HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 241, 260-61 (1982). Professor Merrill further argues that the failure of
EPA to use the CWA to address interstate water pollution is a function of the statute's unrealis-
tic strict liability regime. See Merrill, supra note 2, at 960-61, 992-97.
177 For more evidence that reliance on federal regulation to resolve interstate environmen-
tal disputes is misplaced, we can look to our neighbors to the north, as federal regulatory
efforts in Canada have also failed to address interprovincial environmental impacts. See
DAVID R. BOYD, UNNATURAL LAW: RETHINKING CANADIAN ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND POL-
icy 232 (2003).
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transaction costs of negotiating and enacting compacts explains why this
solution is rarely employed.
Interstate compacts are essentially contracts between states entered into
through state legislation.18 When interstate compacts increase the power of
the states at the expense of the federal government, they are subject to con-
gressional approval. 179 Once an interstate compact has been approved by
Congress, it has the full force and supremacy of federal law.8 0 The terms of
a federally-approved compact can be enforced in federal court if a state ig-
nores its compact duties."'
Future Supreme Court Justice Felix Frankfurter and James Landis sug-
gested using compacts to conserve interstate natural resources over eighty
years ago. 82 Since most interstate environmental harms are regional rather
than national in scope, compacts between the few interested and affected
states make more sense than federai involvement.8 3 Compacts could be
used to create and enforce almost any type of interstate environmental harm
prevention regime, or simply provide a mechanism for "Coasean-type nego-
tiations"'184 to resolve interstate environmental harm disputes. The theoreti-
cal possibilities are endless; unfortunately the political realities are much
dimmer.
There are some notable examples of interstate compacts used to address
interstate environmental harms. At the most basic level are interstate com-
pacts that essentially provide for general information sharing and coordina-
tion of efforts regarding a shared resource. For example, the Great Lakes
Basin Compact, 8 5 approved by Congress in 1968, includes each of the eight
Great Lakes states'86 as members and creates a Great Lakes Commission
comprised of representatives from the member states.8 7 The purpose of the
Great Lakes Basin Compact and the Great Lakes Commission is to gather
data and make non-binding advisory recommendations regarding research
and cooperative programs for the Great Lakes. 8 8 Professor Dellapenna de-
scribes this as a "we'll keep in touch" approach to interstate water manage-
ment that rarely achieves the lofty goals set forth in such agreements. 89
178 See Texas v. New Mexico, 482 U.S. 124, 128 (1987).
"' See U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 10, cl. 3. See also Virginia v. Tennessee, 148 U.S. 503, 519
(1893).
"o See Culyer v. Adams, 449 U.S. 433, 438 (1981) (congressional consent "transforms an
interstate compact ... into a law of the United States").
81 See Texas v. New Mexico, 482 U.S. at 128 (allowing prospective equitable relief as
well as a legal remedy for past breaches).
82 See Felix Frankfurter & James M. Landis, The Compact Clause of the Constitution-A
Study in Interstate Adjustments, 34 YALE L.J. 685, 699 (1925).
183 See Adler, supra note 1, at 141.
184 Wallace E. Oates, A Reconsideration of Environmental Federalism, in RECENT AD-
VANCES IN ENVIRONMENTAL EcONOMics 4 (John A. List & Aart de Zeeuw eds., 2002).
185 Great Lakes Basin Compact, Pub. L. No. 90-419, 82 Stat. 414 (1968).
i86 Illinois, Indiana, Michigan, Minnesota, Ohio, Pennsylvania, New York, and Wisconsin.
87 Great Lakes Basin Compact, art. II, IV, Pub. L. No. 90-419, 82 Stat. 414-16 (1968).
188 Id., art. VI(G),(N), 82 Stat. at 417-18. See also Hall, supra note 6, at 423-24.
189 Joseph W. Dellapenna, Interstate Struggles Over Rivers: The Southeastern States and
the Struggle Over the 'Hooch, 12 N.Y.U. ENVmL. L.J. 828, 838-39 (2005).
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Other compacts provide more substantive solutions to interstate envi-
ronmental harms resulting from use of shared interstate waters. Western
water compacts, such as the Colorado River Compact' 9 and the Rio Grande
Compact,' 9' simply divide and allocate rights to a shared river among the
party states. These compacts seek to manage interstate environmental harms
by limiting the amount of water that can be diverted from a shared water
body. 92 Eastern water compacts, notably the Delaware River Basin Com-
pact193 and the Susquehanna River Basin Compact, 9 4 use a more regulatory
approach. These compacts establish centralized interstate commissions,
comprised of the party states and the federal government, with regulatory
powers over water withdrawals that could have interstate environmental im-
pacts. 95 Some interstate water compacts are focused exclusively on pollu-
tion control, such as the Ohio River Valley Water Sanitation Commission.'96
This eight state compact, enacted in 1948, requires sewage treatment by all
municipalities within the Ohio River basin, backed by a collective enforce-
ment provision. 197
The most recent development in the use of compacts to address inter-
state environmental harms is the proposed Great Lakes-St. Lawrence River
Basin Water Resources Compact. 98 This proposed compact uses a new "co-
operative horizontal federalism" model to create common state environmen-
tal standards to protect interstate natural resources. 99 Under this approach,
states "jointly develop common minimum legal standards (substantive and/
or procedural) to manage a shared resource, but leave the individual states
with the flexibility and autonomy to administer those standards under state
law."2°° An individual state's discretion is limited by programmatic review
and enforcement by its peers, not the federal government.
20
'
Despite the above examples, compacts have proven to be an elusive
mechanism for addressing interstate environmental harms. This is due to
both the nature of interstate environmental harms and the political transac-
tion costs of negotiating and enacting an interstate compact. First, there are
some situations of interstate environmental harms in which the state that is
the source of the harm will not have any incentive to negotiate or enact a
compact with the affected state. Absent pressure from federal adjudication
or regulation, an upstream state will not desire to enter into a compact with a
190 70 CONG. REC. 324 (1928)
19' 53 Stat. 785 (1939).
'
9 2 See Hall, supra note 6, at 411-12.
'93 Pub. L. No. 87-328, 75 Stat. 688 (1961).
'14 Pub. L. No. 91-575, 84 Stat. 1509 (1970).
" See Dellapenna, supra note 189, at 837-50.
196 54 Stat. 752 (1940).
197 See id.
198 Council of Great Lakes Governors, Great Lakes-St. Lawrence River Basin Water Re-
sources Compact (Dec. 13, 2005), available at http://www.cglg.org/projects/water/docs/12-13-
05/GreatLakes-StLawrenceRiver_BasinWaterResources Compact.pdf.
199 See generally Hall, supra note 6.
200 1d. at 406.
201 See id. at 406-07.
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downstream state that limits discharge of water pollution. At times states
remain reluctant to enter into binding compacts even when there is a legiti-
mate threat of interstate litigation. 02
Second, even when states have a shared incentive to enter into a com-
pact, the political transaction costs make negotiating and enacting compacts
very difficult. The transaction costs for bargaining are only justified for
ongoing issues, not discrete problems. A single instance of interstate water
pollution or the siting of a waste facility near a state border would simply
not justify the time, resources, and expertise necessary to negotiate a com-
pact. Negotiating a compact only makes sense when there are repeated
transactions between the states in the form of multiple instances of interstate
environmental harms or reliance on a significant shared natural resource.
Thus, states would not even propose addressing many interstate environmen-
tal harms through a compact.
Third, when state leaders choose to risk the political resources neces-
sary to negotiate a compact, the process of enactment makes success a long-
shot at best. Enactment of a compact requires a high level of political will
and collective action, as compacts must be uniformly ratified by each state's
legislative body and approved by both houses of Congress. The process is a
political obstacle course, especially for compacts between numerous states
that share a large regional resource such as a major airshed. Further, the
compact process challenges the traditional role of state legislatures, since the
negotiations occur up front and no individual state can unilaterally modify
the terms of the compact during ratification.
While the compact process is undermined by high political transaction
costs, other forms of state action to address interstate environmental harms
could avoid these costs. Individual state legislation aided by model uniform
acts or simply reciprocity for substantive similar state laws could accomplish
many of the goals of an interstate compact without the collective action
problems. This is particularly true when the legal regime is premised on
information gathering and public process, rather than liability or adjudica-
tion rules. As discussed in the next Part, individual state legislation for in-
terstate environmental impact assessment, predicated on reciprocity with
other states, is a more politically viable alternative to formal compacts and a
more effective tool for addressing political externalities.
III. A PROPOSAL FOR INTERSTATE ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT ASSESSMENT
As described in Part I of this article, interstate environmental harms can
be viewed as political externalities. Lack of information regarding harms in
another jurisdiction, lack of public process and accountability, and tradi-
tional economic externalization combine to produce inefficient interstate en-
vironmental harms. The failure of federal adjudications, federal regulations,
02 See generally J.B. Ruhl, Equitable Apportionment of Ecosystem Services: New Water
Law for a New Water Age, 19 J. LAND USE & ENVTL. L. 47 (2003); Abrams, supra note 71.
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and interstate compacts to address interstate environmental harms (described
in Part II) is not surprising, since none of these mechanisms have recognized
the underlying causes encompassed in the concept of political externalities.
This Part proposes a new mechanism - interstate environmental impact as-
sessment - to directly address the causes of interstate environmental harms.
Interstate environmental impact assessment builds on both domestic and
transboundary environmental impact assessment law. Thus, this Part first
describes these laws with a focus on their applicability to an interstate envi-
ronmental impact assessment proposal. This Part then proposes the key ele-
ments of an interstate environmental impact assessment necessary to address
political externalities.
A. Environmental Impact Assessment Law
A discussion of environmental impact assessment law should begin
with the National Environmental Policy Act ("NEPA"). 03 Passed in 1969,
NEPA "launched the 'environmental decade' of the 1970s [and] has been
hailed as one of the nation's most important environmental laws."2°4 NEPA
was intended to "promote environmentally sensitive decision-making with-
out prescribing any substantive standards."2 °5 It accomplishes this goal by
requiring information exchange and public processes. NEPA "guarantees
that the relevant information will be made available to the larger audience
that may also play a role in both the decision making process and the imple-
mentation of that decision. '206
NEPA's central legal requirement is that federal agencies prepare an
Environmental Impact Statement ("EIS") whenever a proposed major fed-
eral action will significantly affect the quality of the human environment. 20 7
"[T]his simple information disclosure mandate forces agency managers to
identify and confront the environmental consequences of their actions, about
which they otherwise would remain ignorant. It also opens governmental
203 Pub. L. No. 91-190, 83 Stat. 852 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4347
(2000)).
204 See Bradley C. Karkkainen, Toward a Smarter NEPA: Monitoring and Managing Envi-
ronmental Performance, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 903, 904, 904 n.L (2002) (citing COUNCIL ON
ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY, THE NATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY ACT: A STUDY OF ITS
EFFECTIVENESS AFTER TWENTY-FIVE YEARS 3 (1997); Lynton K. Caldwell, Implementing
NEPA: A Non-Technical Political Task, in ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY AND NEPA: PAST, PRESENT
AND FUTURE 25, 26 (Ray Clark & Larry Canter eds., 1997); Ray Clark, NEPA: The Rational
Approach to Change, in ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY AND NEPA: PAST, PRESENT AND FUTURE 15-
16 (Ray Clark & Larry Canter eds., 1997); DANIEL R. MANDELKER, NEPA LAW & LITIGATION
§ 1.01 (2d ed. 1992); Michael C. Blumm, A Primer on Environmental Law and Some Direc-
tions for the Future, 11 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 381, 382 (1992); William H. Rogers, Jr., The Most
Creative Moments in the History of Environmental Law: "'The Whats," 2000 U. ILL. L. REV. 1,
31)).
205 Anderson v. Evans, 314 F.3d 1006, 1016 (9th Cir. 2002).
206 Robertson v. Methow Valley Citizens Council, 490 U.S. 332, 349 (1989).
207 Sierra Club v. Peterson, 717 F.2d 1409, 1412 (D.C. Cir. 1983). See also 42 U.S.C.
§ 4332(2)(C).
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decisions to an unprecedented level of public scrutiny, with consequent po-
litical implications that decisionmakers ignore only at their peril. ' 208 At its
best, NEPA's EIS process provides a "combustible blend of information,
transparency, and political accountability [which] creates powerful pres-
sures on agency decisionmakers to avoid the most environmentally damag-
ing courses of action, and to mitigate environmental harms when it is cost
effective to do So. '209
NEPA uses information exchange and public process to create account-
ability for federal agencies which are not directly accountable to an electo-
rate. Not only must the EIS be provided to the public, 10 but federal
regulations implementing NEPA further require public notice and comment
when the scope of the EIS is determined, after a draft has been prepared, and
at other key stages of EIS preparation. 21' By "open[ing] government deci-
sionmaking to public scrutiny" NEPA "exerts a powerful prophylactic influ-
ence on the course of agency action." 1 2 As discussed below, this model
could similarly be used to create accountability for state decision-makers not
accountable to the electorate of another state.
The statutory language of NEPA is silent regarding its applicability to
externalized environmental harms imposed outside of the United States.
However, the Council on Environmental Quality213 has issued "Guidance on
NEPA Analyses for Transboundary Impacts. ' '21 4 The guidance recognized
that as a policy matter, NEPA's environmental impact assessment procedures
should apply to projects within the United States that have externalized im-
pacts imposed on other countries." 5 In addition to the Council on Environ-
mental Quality's guidance, numerous federal court decisions have
interpreted NEPA to apply to actions within the United States with external-
ized environmental impacts in other countries. 216 Thus, while NEPA is pri-
marily intended to address intra-jurisdictional environmental harms, it is
208 Karkkainen, supra note 204, at 904-05 & nn.4-5 (citing SERGE TAYLOR, MAKING Bu-
REAUCRACIES TIWNK: THE ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT STRATEGY OF ADMINISTRA-
TIVE REFORM 251 (1984); Jonathan Poisner, A Civic Republican Perspective on the National
Environmental Policy Act's Process for Citizen Participation, 26 ENVTL. L. 53, 54-55 (1996);
Sidney A. Shapiro, Administrative Law After the Counter-Reformation: Restoring Faith in
Pragmatic Government, 48 U. KAN. L. REV. 689, 693-96 (2000)).
209 Id. at 905.
210 See 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C).
21 See 40 C.F.R. §§ 1501.7, 1502.9, 1503 (2007).
212 Karkkainen, supra note 204, at 913.
213 The Council on Environmental Quality was established by NEPA as an agency within
the Executive Office of the President charged with the task of ensuring that federal agencies
meet their obligations under NEPA. See generally 42 U.S.C. §§ 4342, 4344.2 14 
COUNCIL ON ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY GUIDANCE ON NEPA ANALYSES FOR TRANS-
BOUNDARY IMPACTS (July 1, 1997), available at http://ceq.eh.doe.gov/nepa/regs/
transguide.html.
2' Id. ("NEPA requires agencies to include analysis of reasonably foreseeable trans-
boundary effects ....").
216See, e.g., Wilderness Soc'y v. Morton, 463 F.2d 1261 (D.C. Cir. 1972); Swinomish
Tribal Cmty. v. Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm'n, 627 F.2d 499 (D.C. Cir. 1980); Manitoba v.
Norton, 398 F. Supp. 2d 41 (D.D.C. 2005).
[Vol. 32
Hall, Interstate Environmental hnpact Assessment
certainly an applicable (but perhaps not ideal) model for a new policy to
address inter-jurisdictional environmental harms at the state level.
NEPA has already served as a model for advancing the general concept
of environmental impact assessment under state law.217 A recent survey in-
dicated that thirty-two states have some form of environmental impact as-
sessment policy modeled after NEPA.21 8 Not only do these state laws
provide for environmental impact assessment of state projects and permit
decisions, but many of these NEPA-inspired state laws offer improvements
over the original federal act.219 Two key differences between some of the
state laws and NEPA are worth noting for purposes of this discussion.
First, while NEPA is purely procedural and does not require a specific
outcome based on the EIS, a few states have established substantive require-
ments in their environmental impact assessment laws that require mitigation
of environmental impacts. 20 As discussed in the next Section of this Part,
states that impose substantive obligations based on environmental impact
assessments may decide not to extend the substantive obligations to inter-
state environmental impacts, unless the affected state would do the same.
Second, in addition to covering state projects and decisions, some of the
state laws also apply to local governments. 22' This is particularly important
in addressing interstate environmental harms from sprawl, since most land
use decisions are made by local governments. 222 Thus, as discussed in the
next Section, an interstate environmental impact assessment policy should
follow the legal model of states such as California, New York, and Minne-
sota, and include local government actions and decisions.
The concept of environmental impact assessment first provided by
NEPA has not only spread to state law, but also to other countries. Since
NEPA was enacted in the United States, over one hundred countries have
217 See Karkkainen, supra note 204, at 905.
218 See Revesz, supra note 21, at 617-18.
219 See id. at 617-20. For a listing of state environmental impact assessment laws, see
MANDELKER, supra note 204, § 12.02[1].
220 The states that have a substantive requirement to reduce or mitigate negative environ-
mental impacts identified in the environmental impact assessment are California, New York,
Minnesota, Massachusetts, and the District of Columbia. See CAL. PUB. RES. CODE
§ 21,002.1(b) (2007); N.Y. ENVTL. CONSERV. LAW § 8-0109(1) (2007); MINN. STAT.
§ 116D.04(6) (2007); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 30, § 61 (2007); and D.C. CODE ANN. § 6-981
(2007). See also Revesz, supra note 21, at 618-20.
221 The states that subject local governments to environmental impacts assessment require-
ments are California, New York, Minnesota, Massachusetts, and the state of Washington. See
CAL. PUB. RES. CODE §§ 21,003(a), 21,063, 21,151 (defining "public agency" to include "any
county, city and county, city, regional agency, public district, redevelopment agency, or other
political subdivision"); N.Y. ENVTL. CONSERv. LAW § 8-0105 (defining covered "state agen-
cies," as "any ...public authority or commission" and further defining "local agency" as
"[any local agency, board, district, commission or governing body, including any city,
county, and other political subdivision of the state); MINN. STAT. § I 16D.04(l)(a); MASS. GEN.
LAWS ch. 30, § 62 (defining as an "agency" subject to the statute "any authority of any politi-
cal subdivision which is specifically created as an authority under special or general law");
WASH. ADMIN. CODE § 43.21C.020 (2007). See also Barrie v. Kitsap County, 613 P.2d 1148
(Wash. 1980).
222 See Buzbee, supra note 9, at 10.
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established some form of domestic environmental impact assessment law. 223
The widespread adoption of domestic environmental impact assessment law
has facilitated growth of the concept of transboundary environmental impact
assessment under international law.224 But international transboundary envi-
ronmental impact assessment law should not be viewed as merely an exten-
sion of domestic environmental impact assessment law. It is also a
necessary set of procedures related to preventing transboundary pollution
harms, 225 and in this way can serve as a useful model for addressing inter-
state environmental harms.
International transboundary environmental impact assessment is a logi-
cally required first step to prevent international transboundary pollution,
since addressing a harm requires knowing something about it.226 The impor-
tance of transboundary environmental impact assessment under international
law is evident in the United Nations Conference on Environment and Devel-
opment Rio Declaration of 1992:
States shall provide prior and timely notification and relevant in-
formation to potentially affected States on activities that may have
a significant adverse transboundary environmental effect and shall
consult with those States at an early stage and in good faith.227
Despite the widespread adoption of domestic environmental impact assess-
ment laws and the Rio Declaration's support of the principle of trans-
boundary environmental impact assessment, there is still no global treaty on
transboundary environmental impact assessment. 28 There are, however,
several regional models worth noting.2 29 The Convention on Environmental
Impact in a Transboundary Context, 2 0 known as the Espoo Convention, was
signed by primarily European countries in 1991.231 It requires parties to per-
form an environmental impact assessment for any activity that is likely to
cause a significant transboundary environmental impact.23 2 The Espoo Con-
223 See Lois J. Schiffer, The National Environmental Policy Act Today, with an Emphasis
on its Application Across U.S. Borders, 14 DuKE ENVTL. L. & POL'Y F. 325, 327 (2004).
224 See John H. Knox, The Myth and Reality of Transboundary Environmental Impact As-
sessment, 96 AM. J. IrL L. 291, 294 (2002).
225 See id.
226 See id. at 295-96.
227 See Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, U.N. Doc. A/Conf. 151/26, 31
I.L.M. 874, 879 (Principle 19) (1992), available at http://www.unep.orgl
Documents.multilingual/Deafult.asp?DocumentID =78&ArticleID= 1163.
228 See John H. Knox, Assessing the Candidates for a Global Treaty on Transboundary
Environmental Impact Assessment, 12 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L. J. 153, 155 (2003).
229 See id. at 158.
230 Conventon on Environmental Impact in a Transboundary Context, Feb. 25, 1991, 30
I.L.M. 800 (1991) [hereinafter Espoo Convention], available at http://www.unece.org/env/
eia/documents/conventiontextenglish.pdf.
231 The United States and Canada also signed the Espoo Convention, although the United
States has not ratified it. See UNECE, List of Participants for Convention on Environmental
Impact Assessment in a Transboundary Context, http://www.unece.orglenv/eia/convratif.htm
(last visited Dec. 17, 2007) (on file with the Harvard Environmental Law Review).
232 Espoo Convention, supra note 230, art. 2(2), 30 I.L.M. at 803.
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vention also provides a significant role for public participation 233 in an effort
"to improve the quality of information presented to decision makers so that
environmentally sound decisions can be made.
'234
A second potential model is the International Law Commission's 35
Draft Articles on Prevention of Transboundary Harm from Hazardous Activ-
ities. 236 The draft articles "apply to activities not prohibited by international
law which involve a risk of causing significant transboundary harm through
their physical consequences, 23 7 a problem analogous to interstate environ-
mental harms. Environmental impact assessment with extensive public par-
ticipation is an important component of the draft articles. 238 Most notably,
article 13 provides that "[s]tates concerned shall, by such means as are ap-
propriate, provide the public likely to be affected by an activity within the
scope of the present articles with relevant information relating to that activ-
ity, the risk involved and the harm which might result and ascertain their
views. '23 9 One commentator has described this combination of information
and public participation as a potential solution to transboundary environmen-
tal impacts in the international context:
In the transboundary context, where externalities are all but inevi-
table, public access to environmental information may be one use-
ful mechanism to force States to take into account the views of all
those who are impacted by actions taken within their borders,
whether the affected persons are voting citizens or residents of
other States. Information can help affected populations shine light
on governmental decisions and rally political support in favor of
233 See id. at art. 2(6), 30 I.L.M. at 804 ("The Party of origin shall provide, in accordance
with the provisions of this Convention, an opportunity to the public in the areas likely to be
affected to participate in relevant environmental impact assessment procedures regarding pro-
posed activities and shall ensure that the opportunity provided to the public of the affected
Party is equivalent to that provided to the public of the Party of origin."); id. at art. 3(8), 30
I.L.M. at 806 ("The concerned Parties shall ensure that the public of the affected Party in the
areas likely to be affected be informed of, and be provided with possibilities for making com-
ments or objections on, the proposed activity, and for the transmittal of these comments or
objections to the competent authority of the Party of origin, either directly to this authority or,
where appropriate, through the Party of origin."): id. at art. 4(2), 30 I.L.M. at 806 ("The Party
of origin shall furnish the affected Party, as appropriate through a joint body where one exists,
with the environmental impact assessment documentation. The concerned Parties shall arrange
for distribution of the documentation to the authorities and the public of the affected Party in
the areas likely to be affected and for the submission of comments to the competent authority
of the Party of origin, either directly to this authority or, where appropriate, through the Party
of origin within a reasonable time before the final decision is taken on the proposed activity.").
234 Id. at preamble, 30 I.L.M. 802.
235 The International Law Commission is the United Nations body charged with codifica-
tion and development of public international law. See G.A. Res. 174. U.N. GAOR, 2nd Sess..
at 105-10, U.N. Doc. A/519 (1947).
236 See Report of the International Law Commission, U.N. GAOR, 53rd Sess., Supp. No.
10, at 366-436, U.N. Doc. No. A/56/10 (2001). The draft articles are available at http://un-
treaty.un.org/ilc/texts/ instruments/english/draft%20articles/9_7_2001 .pdf.
237 Id. at 371.
231 See id. art. 7, 13, at 373, 375.
239 Id. at 375.
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their interests, even when the political entities making the deci-
sions are not directly accountable to them.240
Information and public participation could similarly be used to directly
address the underlying political externality causes of interstate environmen-
tal harms. In some respects, interstate environmental impact assessment is
more promising than the international proposals, as the systems of law and
principles of non-discrimination are more firmly established among the
American states than among the many nations of the world. Further, as even
this brief review of environmental impact assessment law makes clear, there
is a tremendous legal tradition for use of information and public process to
minimize environmental impacts. The concept of environmental impact as-
sessment, first established in the United States, spread relatively quickly to
over a hundred other legal systems. This facilitated the use of transboundary
environmental impact assessment as a way to address the challenge of trans-
boundary environmental harms under international law. Now the domestic
legal system should "rediscover" the concept and apply it to the century-old
problem of interstate environmental harms in the United States.
B. Crafting an Interstate Environmental Impact Assessment Policy
This Section provides some guidance on the key aspects of an interstate
environmental impact assessment policy. The specific statutory language
and drafting of such a proposal should be left for another day and a more
collaborative process involving state decision-makers. The best policies are
developed with the input of numerous stakeholders, especially those with
knowledge and perspectives unique to their experiences and interests. Fur-
thermore, a specific model statute should come from the geographically and
politically diverse state policy makers themselves. However, to begin the
discussion and frame the issues, it is important to establish the fundamental
principles of an interstate environmental impact assessment policy. This can
be organized by the basic questions of who, when, what, where, and why?2 4'
The key aspects of an interstate environmental impact assessment pol-
icy can be summarized as follows: a state would be required by its own state
law to provide a public process for the exchange of information regarding
interstate environmental impacts. Either the government or the citizens of a
potentially affected state could petition the source state to engage in the in-
terstate environmental impact assessment. However, the source state would
only be obligated to consider petitions from the government or citizens of a
240 Carrie Noteboom, Addressing the External Effects of Internal Environmental Deci-
sions: Public Access to Environmental Information in the International Law Commission's
Draft Articles on Prevention of Transboundary Harm, 12 N.Y.U. ENvT. L.J. 245, 248 (2003).
241 The "where" is, for purposes of this article, limited to the continental United States,
although the principles and concepts may apply on a broader scale. The "why" is hopefully
answered in the analysis of interstate environmental harms as political externalities (supra Part
I) and the failure to address such harms in our federalist system (supra Part II). Thus, this Part
focuses on "who, when, and what?"
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state that also provides interstate environmental impact assessment. This
creates the necessary incentive for states to impose the statutory obligation
on themselves. The interstate environmental impact assessment duty would
apply to both state actions and state decisions allowing private actions. The
assessment itself would contain not only environmental impact information
but also a cost-benefit analysis that includes costs externalized on other
states. The interstate environmental impact assessment duty is merely pro-
cedural and does not dictate a specific outcome, even if alternatives with less
impact are clearly identified. As discussed in the Conclusion of this article,
a procedural interstate environmental impact assessment duty would none-
theless affect decision-maker choices and could be used to complement sub-
stantive legal obligations.
Who would enact an interstate environmental impact assessment pol-
icy? To avoid the political transaction costs and challenges of an interstate
compact, interstate environmental impact assessment laws should be enacted
by states individually. This could be accomplished either by incorporating
an interstate environmental impact assessment duty into existing state envi-
ronmental impact assessment law 242 or adopting a new model statute. Either
way, non-discrimination and reciprocity provide the underlying foundation
and incentive for adoption of an interstate environmental impact assessment
duty by individual states. States would only have an interstate environmen-
tal impact assessment duty to those states that also have a similar law. This
could be implemented either by requiring some minimum standards for ade-
quacy of an interstate environmental impact assessment policy, or by the
source state only providing what would be provided to it by the affected
state if the roles were reversed.
Admittedly, this does create a risk of free riders. Some interstate envi-
ronmental harms affect multiple states, and it is possible that one of the
affected states would not have adopted an interstate environmental impact
assessment policy but would be able to free ride off of the duty owed to
another affected state that has adopted such a policy. This concern is mini-
mized, however, as the free riding state would not have the benefits of public
hearings in its jurisdiction and other measures described in this Section. The
reciprocity approach is also a potential way of addressing the issue of sub-
stantive versus purely procedural state environmental impact assessment
laws. As discussed in the previous Section, some state environmental im-
pact assessment laws create a substantive duty to minimize environmental
impacts. 243 Using a reciprocity approach, these states would only extend a
substantive duty to mitigate interstate environmental impacts to projects af-
fecting states that also have enacted a substantive duty law. As New York
242 Thirty-two states already have some form of an environmental impact assessment pol-
icy which could be amended to incorporate an interstate duty. See Revesz, supra note 21, at
617-18.
243 See supra note 220.
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and Massachusetts are currently the only neighboring states with substantive
environmental impact assessment laws, this would be relatively rare.
Premising the interstate environmental impact assessment duty on reci-
procity addresses a major challenge of interstate environmental harms. On
any given interstate environmental problem, there is a source (i.e., upwind or
upstream) state, and at least one affected (i.e., downwind or downstream)
state. On the basis of individual "transactions," source states would not
have any incentive to provide even procedural relief to affected states. How-
ever, all states (excluding Alaska and Hawaii) are potentially affected states
on an aggregate basis. This point was made in an amici brief filed by over
thirty states in Rapanos v. United States:244
[W]ater flows downhill, and each of the lower 48 States has water
bodies that are downstream of one or more other States. As set
forth in the Appendix to this brief, every State in the continental
United States has at least one traditional navigable water with a
portion of that river or lake within one or more other States; many
have several such waters.2 45
All states recognize that they face potential risks from interstate envi-
ronmental harms, and would want the procedural rights afforded by an inter-
state environmental impact assessment policy. Further, citizens and
environmental NGOs would have little trouble identifying specific interstate
environmental harm risks to drive home this point with their respective leg-
islators. And unlike an interstate compact, an interstate environmental im-
pact policy would not be doomed, but rather would only be limited in its
applicability, by a decision by some states not to enact a policy. Thus, indi-
vidual state action premised on reciprocity and non-discrimination provides
the incentives and benefits of collective action without the political and
transaction costs.
Second, when would an interstate environmental impact assessment
need to be prepared? This is essentially a question of triggering. Borrowing
(with slight modification) from NEPA, an interstate environmental impact
assessment would be required for any major state action with potential to
significantly affect the quality of the human environment in another state.246
The source state, the affected state, or the citizens of either state could re-
quest an interstate environmental impact assessment when this standard is
met (assuming that both the source and affected states have enacted an inter-
state environmental impact assessment policy). While this standard may ap-
pear vague or ambiguous, there is a massive body of case law under both
NEPA and state environmental impact assessment laws to provide gui-
244 126 S.Ct. 2208 (2006) (concerning federal jurisdiction over "isolated" wetlands under
the federal CWA).
245 Brief of the States of New York et al. as Amici Curae Supporting Respondents, at 2,
Rapanos v. United States, 126 S.Ct. 2208 (2006) (Nos. 04-1034, 04-1384), 2006 WL 139208.
246 See Sierra Club v. Peterson, 717 F.2d 1409, 1412-13 (D.C. Cir. 1983). See also 42
U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C) (2000).
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dance.2 47 Again borrowing from both NEPA and state law, state action
should be defined to include not only projects funded or constructed by the
state, but also decisions by the state to permit or approve a private action.
To address the interstate environmental harms from sprawl, it is critical
that local governments be subject to an interstate environmental impact as-
sessment policy. Most land use decisions are made by local governments,2 48
and these decisions may have impacts in other states. As noted in Part I, over
thirty of the largest metropolitan areas in the United States extend across
state lines.2 49 An interstate environmental impact assessment policy should
build on the examples set by California, New York, Minnesota, Massachu-
setts, and the state of Washington2 50 and apply to local as well as state
government.
Because an interstate environmental impact assessment policy is in-
tended to address only physical interstate environmental harms, neither pe-
cuniary nor psychological harms should trigger the assessment duty. As
discussed in Part I, pecuniary harms occur when interstate regulatory compe-
tition causes a loss of economic activity, or perhaps a lowering of environ-
mental standards, as regulated businesses relocate or threaten to relocate.25" '
Psychological interstate environmental externalities occur when a state al-
lows harm to a resource within its territory (such as a state park) that has
existence value for citizens of other states.252 Pecuniary and psychological
harms pose a political issue distinct from physical interstate environmental
harms, and an interstate environmental impact assessment policy is simply
not the best legal tool to solve the problem.
Finally, what should be required of an interstate environmental impact
assessment? First, public participation throughout the process is necessary
to inform the interstate environmental impact assessment. As noted above,
public participation could produce a better knowledge base to inform deci-
sions. Equally important, public participation is itself an important element
in addressing the underlying political externalities that cause inefficient in-
terstate environmental harms. At a minimum, public hearings should be
held in the communities affected by the potential interstate environmental
harm, forcing the decision-makers to visit such locations and hear the con-
cerns of citizens.
Ideally, an interstate environmental impact assessment policy would go
beyond traditional public participation, which is often characterized by "rel-
atively infrequent and superficial opportunities for consultation," often lim-
ited to "peak-level moments" such as when an EIS is issued.253 Instead,
247 See generally MANDELKER, supra note 204.
248 See Buzbee, supra note 9, at 10.
249 See supra note 39.
250 See supra note 221.
211 See Merrill, supra note 2, at 968-70.
232 See id. at 968 n. 184.
23 Jody Freeman & Daniel A. Farber, Modular Environmental Regulation, 54 DUKE L.
795, 896 (2005).
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public participation in the interstate environmental impact assessment pro-
cess should support the "modular" approach to environmental decision-
making advanced by Professors Jody Freeman and Daniel Farber. 2 4 Under
this approach, stakeholders play a diversity of roles, including generating
policy ideas and "perform[ing] an accountability function. '255 Because
"state agencies have no monopoly on the scientific and technological knowl-
edge required to address complex environmental problems," meaningful in-
volvement by "sophisticated local institutions or interest groups" can
produce demonstrable improvements in environmental decisions. 256
The modularity approach should be further used to incorporate social
learning and adaptive management into the interstate environmental impact
assessment process.257 While retaining flexibility is critical, some basic ele-
ments may be required of an assessment. First, to overcome the economic
externalities that bias state decisions, a cost-benefit analysis should be per-
formed that incorporates information from the affected state. While the
source state would not be required to avoid costs that are not justified by the
project's benefits, the exchange and learning of this information could influ-
ence decisions. Second, an alternatives analysis is a basic element of most
environmental impact assessments that should be used in the interstate con-
text as well. Combined with a modular approach to information exchange
and social learning, a genuine discussion of alternatives may provide solu-
tions that meet the source state's objectives with reduced impacts on the
affected state.
A new interstate environmental impact assessment policy also provides
an opportunity to improve on NEPA and craft a "smarter" environmental
impact assessment law.25 8 Specifically, an interstate environmental impact
assessment policy should incorporate Professor Karkkainen's recommenda-
tions and "require monitoring, ongoing policy and project reassessment,
[and] adaptive mitigation."25 9 While NEPA is based on a "1960s-style faith
in comprehensive bureaucratic rationality," 26° three decades of post-NEPA
experience with environmental decision-making has produced valuable les-
sons to incorporate into a new interstate environmental impact assessment
policy. Most importantly, NEPA's "naive faith in the predictive capacities of
rational bureaucrats" should be modernized with "'post project assessment,'
that is, ongoing monitoring, reevaluation, or project adjustments or adapta-
tions in response to new information or changing conditions. 26'
Why is it so important that an interstate environmental impact assess-
ment policy incorporate post-project assessment? Because pre-project as-
254 See id. at 894-95.
255 Id. at 894.
256 Id. at 895.
257 See id. at 883-84.
258 See generally Karkkainen, supra note 204.
259 Id. at 908.
260 Id. at 925.
26, Id. at 927.
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sessments, the central feature of NEPA and most other environmental impact
assessment laws, are often wrong. According to one recent study of EISs
performed pursuant to NEPA, "fewer than one out of three verifiable predic-
tions correctly forecast both the direction and the approximate magnitude of
the environmental impact. 26 2 This should not be taken as a criticism of
predictive environmental impact assessments, but as a recognition of their
limitations. Predictions are simply that, and environmental decisions should
be based on both predictions of anticipated impacts and information learned
after the initial decision has been made.
This leads to two of Professor Karkkainen's specific recommendations
that should be incorporated into an interstate environmental impact assess-
ment policy. First, post-decision monitoring is necessary to "gauge the ac-
tual environmental consequences" of the state project or decision.263 This
information would be shared with the affected state and public consistent
with the public participation principles discussed above. Second, using the
information learned through post-decision monitoring, the source state
should use adaptive management to avoid unpredicted harms. While this
may seem to create an additional burden, it could actually make the initial
assessment less costly and difficult, since less up-front certainty and conser-
vatism in predictions would be needed. 264 These concepts are not new, as
they are used in other environmental impact assessment policies. For exam-
ple, the Canadian Environmental Assessment Act uses "follow-up pro-
grams" as a form of post-decision monitoring. 265 Domestically, the
California Environmental Quality Act uses post-decision monitoring and re-
porting to verify mitigation measures. 266 An interstate environmental impact
assessment policy should build on these leading examples.
Finally, as with any administrative decision, enforcement and judicial
review would be essential. For this, no new legal or policy ground needs to
be broken. A source state's failure to perform an interstate environmental
impact assessment and the adequacy of an interstate environmental impact
assessment would be reviewable in the source state's courts pursuant to ei-
ther the source state's environmental impact assessment law or the source
state's administrative procedure act. States would only need to provide a
right for citizens in affected states that have adopted an interstate environ-
mental impact assessment policy to participate in administrative and judicial
proceedings pursuant to the source state's interstate environmental impact
assessment law. This could simply be effected through a provision in the
interstate environmental impact assessment statute. Alternatively, states
could adopt the Uniform Transboundary Pollution Reciprocal Access Act,
2 6 2 Id. at 928 (citing PAUL J. CULHANE ET AL., FORECASTS AND ENVIRONMENTAL DECI-
SIONMAKING: THE CONTENT AND PREDICTIVE ACCURACY OF ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATE-
MENTS 111-112 (1987)).
261 Id. at 938.2
1 See id. at 941.
265 Canadian Environmental Assessment Act, 1992 S.C., ch. 37 §§ 2(l), 14, 16(2)(c).266 See CAL. PUB. RES. CODE, §§ 21,100, 21,081.6 (2007).
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which provides citizens of other states with equal access to state judicial and
administrative systems to address transboundary pollution. 67 The Uniform
Transboundary Pollution Reciprocal Access Act only grants reciprocal ac-
cess to citizens of states that have also enacted the model law. 6 As it has
been enacted by only eight U.S. states,2 69 more widespread adoption would
be necessary.
This discussion of the key elements of an interstate environmental im-
pact assessment policy is not intended to be either complete or definitive. It
is only meant to address the major substantive issues needed to understand
the concept of interstate environmental impact assessment. If state policy
makers are persuaded that the concept has merit, then the next step is to
gather their ideas and expertise and move forward collaboratively. Given
the above discussion regarding the benefits of incorporating public participa-
tion, modular environmental decision-making, and adaptive management in
an interstate environmental impact assessment policy, it would be hypocriti-
cal to suggest that the policy itself would not also benefit from these tools.
C. Evaluating the Necessity and Effectiveness of an Interstate
Environmental Impact Assessment Policy
As a practical matter, it is important to evaluate the proposed interstate
environmental impact assessment policy with three questions: why is it
needed, will it do any good, and would states actually pass it into law? To
begin to answer these questions, it is useful to take an in-depth look at a
recent interstate environmental dispute.
In June 2007, the state of Indiana proposed issuance of a permit pursu-
ant to the federal CWA270 to the oil company BP authorizing the release of
1,584 pounds of ammonia and 4,925 pounds of suspended solids daily into
Lake Michigan from BP's Whiting, Indiana refinery.271 BP sought the permit
as part of a $3 billion expansion of its Whiting facility's capacity to refine
heavy crude oil from Alberta, Canada.272 The BP Whiting refinery, origi-
nally built in 1889 by John D. Rockefeller, is now the fourth largest refinery
in the country. 273 The permit was issued by Indiana in August 2007, with
267 Uniform Transboundary Pollution Reciprocal Access Act §§ 1-10, 9C U.L.A. 392-98
(1982), available at http://www.ulcc.ca/en/us/index.cfm?sec= 1&sub= lt4.26 See id. §§ 1-3.
269 See Uniform Law Conference of Canada, Table of Uniform Statutes Listed by Statute,
http://www.ulcc.ca/en/us/Table 3 En.pdf (last visited Jan. 8, 2008). The states are Connecti-
cut, Colorado, Michigan, Minnesota, Montana, New Jersey, Oregon, and Wisconsin.
270 Like most states, the state of Indiana has authority from the EPA to issue National
Pollutant Discharge Elimination System permits. See Envtl. Council of the States, State Dele-
gations - CWA, http://www.ecos.org/section/states/enviro-actlist/statesenviroactlistcwa
(last visited Dec. 17, 2007) (on file with the Harvard Environmental Law Review).
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almost no opposition from within the state. 274 Indiana Governor Mitch Dan-
iels supported the refinery expansion and permit issuance, lauding it as "an-
other huge step in Indiana's economic comeback." '275
However, once news of the refinery expansion and permit issuance
spread to neighboring Illinois, public and political opposition was dra-
matic.276 Chicago Mayor Richard M. Daley and Illinois Governor Rod
Blagojevich harshly criticized both BP and Indiana.277 One Republican
lawmaker from Chicago attacked BP's marketing claims of "beyond petro-
leum" as really standing for "bad polluter. 278 Over 50,000 citizens signed
petitions opposing the plant expansion and permit. 27 9 Opponents initially
sought action and oversight from EPA, but the agency made clear early on
that it would not stop Indiana from issuing the permit. 280
After the permit was issued and public opposition mounted, Indiana
politicians held a hearing to explore the issue.28" ' However, due to the way in
which it was conducted, the hearing only exacerbated the conflict. 282 Chi-
cago Mayor Daley sent two top city officials to the hearing, but the Indiana
lawmaker chairing the hearing would not allow the Chicago officials to tes-
tify.283 The resulting war-of-words demonstrates the level of conflict that
can arise in interstate environmental disputes. The Chicago Park Superin-
tendent, one of the Chicago officials that intended to testify, was "insulted"
by the snub and stated: "They can keep their pollution on their side of the
lake. This is ridiculous."2 84 The Indiana lawmaker who called the hearing
was unapologetic. While claiming that time constraints prevented him from
allowing the Chicago officials to testify, he also stated that "this is an Indi-
ana hearing," and "[w]e here in Indiana know what the issues are." '285
Unfortunately, what was lost in the political fighting was the opportu-
nity to exchange information that could have minimized the conflict. The
city of Chicago commissioned a report showing that BP could upgrade its
wastewater treatment for less than $40 million (a significant sum, but only
an increase of about one percent for the total project cost of over $3 bil-
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280 Id. The EPA did, however, suggest efforts BP could make, such as restoring wetlands
along the Lake Michigan shore near the discharge site.
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educate the concerned public in Illinois. The deputy water administrator for
the Wisconsin Department of Natural Resources, who was not involved in
the dispute (even though Wisconsin also shares Lake Michigan waters), con-
cluded that there would not be "a problem [locally or lake-wide] as a result
of this discharge. 28 7 A University of Wisconsin scientist noted that the ad-
ditional ammonia that would be discharged is "less than one-7 millionth of
the amount already in the lake. 288
Because there was no process to allow both the Indiana decision-mak-
ers and the potentially affected Illinois public to educate each other and
share concerns, the environmental impact of the discharge is not well under-
stood. Instead, the dispute quickly devolved into a political shouting match
that failed to address the concerns of either state. After intense public and
political pressure, BP announced that it would not take advantage of its new
permit to increase discharges. 89 However, the permit remains in effect, so
opponents in Illinois have no legal certainty that discharges will not increase
in the future.219
This recent dispute helps explain why an interstate environmental im-
pact assessment policy is needed, despite the federal regulatory system.
While debate regarding the legal authority of EPA in this matter may con-
tinue, as a practical matter EPA showed little willingness to take a proactive
role in either substantively limiting the discharge or in any other way resolv-
ing the dispute. Illinois was clearly surprised and disappointed by the lack
of federal oversight, as were many concerned citizens. Coverage of the dis-
pute in the international periodical The Economist noted that "despite the
common desire to keep the [Great L]akes clean, there is confusion over who
is in charge of doing so. '291
The dispute also shows the good that could come from an interstate
environmental impact assessment policy. There is tremendous value in hav-
ing an adequate process to address public concerns. Simply having an estab-
lished policy for conducting interstate environmental impact assessment
hearings might have prevented the "snub" to the Illinois officials that esca-
lated the fight. The interstate environmental impact assessment policy
would only be procedural in most applications, so it might not provide the
legal certainty lacking in the Illinois-Indiana dispute. Yet a process-based
approach would likely reduce interstate environmental harms in several
ways. First, the process itself provides a mechanism to overcome the infor-
mational and public participation biases that give rise to interstate political
externalities. Better information, more educated and engaged citizens, and
the pressures of public participation can affect the choices of state decision-
makers. An affected state's elected officials, agency staff, and citizens may
have useful information to improve proposed projects and reduce environ-
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mental impacts. 292 The information produced to the public could empower
citizens and spur community activism.293 A cost-benefit accounting of the
project that includes costs externalized on other states would prevent state
decision-makers from operating under "fiscal illusions,' 294 forcing them to
confront the true costs of their decisions.
Second, the interstate environmental impact assessment process and in-
formational outcome would complement existing substantive duties under
both federal and state law that restrict excessive interstate environmental
harms. Interstate environmental impact assessment should thus be viewed as
an addition to the current interstate environmental harm prevention and lia-
bility regime described in Part II, not as a substitute. For example, the infor-
mation gathered and produced in an interstate environmental impact
assessment would be tremendously valuable to a federal court adjudicating
an interstate nuisance claim, especially a claim involving complex technical
and scientific issues. As discussed in Part 11, the Supreme Court has ex-
pressly stated its reluctance to adjudicate complex technical environmental
disputes between states, 295 and would likely view a comprehensive interstate
environmental impact assessment as a valuable source of information, espe-
cially if it carries the additional legitimacy of public participation.
The information produced in an interstate environmental impact assess-
ment could also complement federal statutory duties regarding interstate pol-
lution. 296 Further, it could help overcome the transaction costs of interstate
agreements identified in Part II. A reciprocal interstate environmental im-
pact assessment policy would also counter the lack of incentives for states to
gather information and learn more about commonly shared interstate
resources. 97
The Illinois-Indiana Lake Michigan pollution dispute also helps demon-
strate that state lawmakers may be willing to enact an environmental impact
assessment policy. In the wake of the dispute, the Midwestern Legislative
Conference of the Council of State Governments held its annual meeting in
Traverse City, Michigan, a few hundred miles up the Lake Michigan shore-
line from the BP Whiting refinery. At the meeting, the state lawmakers in
attendance unanimously adopted a resolution recognizing that resources
such as the Great Lakes are a shared responsibility of neighboring states, and
urging the states and Congress to consider new policies to better meet their
292 See Frances Irwin & Carl Bruch, Information, Public Participation, and Justice, 32
ENVTL. L. REP., 10,784, 10,788 (2002); Jim Rossi, Participation Run Amok: The Cost of Mass
Participation for Deliberative Agency Decisionmaking, 92 Nw. U. L. REV. 173, 185-87
(1997).
293 Noteboom, supra note 240, at 278.
294 Ammon Lehavi, Intergovernmental Liability Rules, 92 VA. L. REV. 929, 942 (2006).
295 See Ohio v. Wyandotte Chems. Corp., 401 U.S. 493, 504-05 (1970).
296 See CAA §§ I 10(a)(2)(D), 126(b), 42 U.S.C. §§ 7410(a)(2)(D), 7426(b) (2000), CWA
§§ 402(b)(3), (5), 33 U.S.C. § 1342(b)(3), (5) (2000).
297 See Carol M. Rose, Scientific Innovation and Environmental Protection: Some Ethical
Considerations, 32 ENVTL. L. 755, 761 (2002) ("Just as no one in particular is rewarded for
preserving open-access common resources, no one is rewarded for learning about them either
....1).
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shared environmental goals. After disputes such as this, it becomes even
more clear that management of interstate environmental harms (as well as
multi-billion dollar investments) should not be based on a political war-of-
words or state rivalries, but instead should utilize an open process of public
participation and information exchange.
CONCLUSION
Solving a policy problem requires first understanding its causes. The
problem of interstate environmental harms can be understood as a problem
of political externalities - a combination of inadequate information, public
process bias, and traditional economic externalities. Addressing interstate
environmental harms through federal adjudication or regulation is at best a
rough method to respond to these underlying factors. An interstate environ-
mental impact assessment policy, adopted by individual states but premised
on reciprocity, directly addresses the political externality problem. Because
this policy is only procedural and does not substantively alter states' rights, it
is politically viable and potentially appealing to politicians with diverse ide-
ologies. An interstate environmental impact assessment policy would pro-
vide both a new solution in itself and an improvement to the existing legal
regime. It is an effective and pragmatic policy solution that deserves the
consideration of state leaders.
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